O
n a weekday evening in September 1977, an ethnic church in San Francisco was
to capacity, with the overflow crowded into the church social room. There a
closed-circuit television set monitored the service, moving from the closed
casket, to the wreaths of flowers, to the photograph of a young man. The
minister eulogized the deceased, a third-year law student, and at times burst
into seething anger over the tragic circumstances that led to the death of the young
man. Telegrams of condolences were read, including one from Seattle, Washington,
from the parents of a young woman, whose funeral service was going to be held
later that weekend. The two young people had been planning to be married.

The deceased were among the five killed and 11 others wounded on a Labor
Day weekend at a popular after-hours restaurant in San Francisco’s Chinatown.
Three masked gunmen burst into the Golden Dragon and sprayed the restaurant
with automatic weapons and a shotgun, which the police claimed to be related to
the hostility among youth gang factions. The five killed added to the total of over
50 victims in Chinatown-related incidents over the past 10 years. The most recent
incident came to be known as the Golden Dragon massacre.

In the wake of the Golden Dragon massacre, Police Chief Charles Gain formed
a 20-officer Chinatown Task Force and Mayor George Moscone announced a
$25,000 reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of the killers
responsible for the massacre. Three weeks had gone by with no arrest of a suspect.
Liberal Mayor George Moscone called a press conference and announced that he and
Chief Charles Gain had decided to increase the reward from $25,000 to $100,000
“in hopes it will be so tempting that someone who has not yet come forward will
decide to do so” (San Francisco Chronicle, September 21, 1977).

At the same press conference, the mayor said he had eaten a quiet dinner
Saturday evening with his wife and children in Chinatown a half-block from the
Golden Dragon. According to press accounts, the mayor had said, apparently in
response to a question on the decline of Chinatown businesses, “in my view, the
issue in Chinatown is only secondarily the economy. The main efforts of this city
must be to make sure that no one’s person is threatened” (Ibid.).

Another mayor of San Francisco, George Moscone’s predecessor, was much

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more candid, revealing the importance of Chinatown to the city’s reputation as a tourist center. On June 26, 1973, the director of a Chinatown delinquency prevention project, Barry Fong-Torres, a graduate of the Berkeley School of Criminology, was chatting with a friend in his apartment, when someone rang the doorbell. Moments after he opened the door, five shots were fired, with bullets striking him in the head, eye, mouth, and chest. He died almost instantly. A few days later in a press conference, Mayor Joseph Alioto, although expressing dismay over the killing, minimized it by reassuring white people that they would be safe in Chinatown, since all of the murder victims had been Chinese. In the opinion of the mayor, the Chinese quarter was still “the safest place in town for tourists and Caucasians” (quoted in Light and Wong, 1975: 1359).

At the writing of this article, several months have passed. Several more killings have occurred since the Golden Dragon massacre, involving Chinese victims. The murders continue to remain unsolved and business in Chinatown continues as usual. Chinatown has been described by some as the gilded ghetto. Behind the ornate neon signs is the work of the people, redistributing commodities for retail sales and converting foodstuff into consumable commodities that are uniquely Chinese. Others, mainly women, work in the garment industry. The people work more than eight hours a day, but the median family income for a family of four permits them to just barely get by. Chinatown is the poorest section of San Francisco.

Chinatown does not belong to its people. By this we mean that Chinatown is not a community of people with common interests; nor is it organized to meet the needs of its residents. It is instead a mass of people identifiable by race and organized from the most humble worker and employer in Chinatown, to the downtown hotels, the airlines, the surrounding industries (fishing, poultry, meat, rice, and the overseas trade), and to the Chamber of Commerce, each linked to the other, and each dependent upon the other to form the structure of the tourist industry.

The people work in what is commonly known as service occupations. But as Braverman (1974: 360) noted, “restaurant labor, which cooks, prepares, assembles, serves, cleans dishes and utensils, etc., carries on tangible production just as much as labor employed in many another manufacturing process.” He added: “Service occupations have formed a large share in the social division of labor throughout the capitalist era...but they have not formed a ‘productive’ or profitable part until recently” (p. 363).

“Chinatown,” as distinguished from a racially homogeneous community of people, is a recent phenomenon and we need a historical analysis to understand its development. Race and racism are parts of this history and cannot be separated from the transformation of labor process that channeled the Chinese into particular occupations. Thus, the relation between race and class is viewed as a process within the context of capitalist expansion and accumulation. To illustrate the point, the internationalization of labor that originally brought the Chinese under contract to
the United States requires an understanding of the development and expansion of capitalism in the Western United States.

Our purpose in this article is to go beyond the usual statistical studies that report a relationship between race and crime or class and crime. We know that blacks are killed by the police at a rate 13 times higher than that for whites; we know that prison populations are overrepresented by people of color; and we know that crime and crime victimization are highest in poor communities, especially in the black and brown communities. But we know very little about how racial communities emerge and persist in large urban centers; and we know even less of how crime, other than in its statistical association with poverty conditions, becomes a fact of life in these poor communities. Our task is to provide a beginning analysis of the two areas by focusing upon Chinatown, which has become the scene of several dozen murders in the last 10 years.

The Chinese in Early California

Gold was discovered in California in 1849, a historical fact known to almost every youngster in public school, but what is perhaps not widely known is that by 1854, the gold fields of California had panned out, the state had not yet established a stable agricultural economy, and California along with the rest of the nation was in the throes of an economic depression. One area of the nation’s economy, the shipping industry, was not affected. The American clipper ship linked California with Hong Kong to cover the distance in 30 days, eclipsing the old sailing vessel time by almost one-half. The tonnage of the clippers was almost 2,000 (compared to a ship of 450 tons) and on a single voyage, 500 Chinese laborers represented the equivalent of $37,000 in passage fees (Barth, 1964: 61). As surface mining close to natural waterways became scarce, the independent miner-prospector was replaced by Chinese indentured workers employed by quartz and hydraulic mining companies.

Several contributing factors, some independent of one another, resulted in over 16,000 Chinese arrivals in 1854, an increase of fourfold over the previous year, and two to eight times more for each year thereafter for the next 20 years (Coolidge, 1909; Sandmeyer, 1939). The China of this period was in shambles, brought about by the aggressive colonial policies of the British East India Trading Company, which, by promoting the Opium Wars, completely destroyed the self-supporting economy of China. The ensuing Taiping Rebellion, and natural disasters, seriously dislocated the people of China. Thus, a highly disciplined and technically trained labor pool became available with the sudden and tremendous need for an exploitable labor force in the Western United States.¹

Since the average Chinese laborer did not have the resources to pay his way across the Pacific, he signed a contract, sometimes involuntarily, with a representative of the shipping company, or with an intermediary, to labor for a period of three to 10 years under servitude. Similar to the auctioning of slaves in the South,
commission merchants in San Francisco advertised the services of Chinese for specified periods of years. Anti-Chinese agitation began soon thereafter.

Organized labor led the movement against the Chinese. Labor’s indictment of the Chinese contract originally began as an indictment of the contract labor system, but the inability or unwillingness of the legislature or the courts to control the abuses of the system, and the continued support of the Chinese by the capitalists in railroads, mining, and agriculture, resulted in a generalized attack on the Chinese. But the ambivalence toward the Chinese was frequently expressed in news items. D. Supple, Chairman of the Anti-Coolie Committee, stated: “[He] did not blame the Chinese for being here but thought the blame belonged to that class of employers and manufacturers who employed them to reduce the wages of white labor” (Daily Alta California, March 7, 1867). The same paper in an editorial condemned the Republican State Convention’s doctrine that the Asiatic races should not be allowed to come to the United States as “stupid” and “absurd.” The editorial noted that to banish the Chinese would be disastrous when “a third of our (grain) harvest was gathered by Asiatic labor” (Daily Alta California, June 16, 1867).

But with each crisis in the political economy, ambitious political candidates employed racism to divide the working class by playing upon the fears of orientalization. Henry Haight (soon to be elected governor of California) called upon “Germans, Irishmen, and Americans to establish beyond question that California is to be ruled by white men, and not by Chinamen” (Daily Alta California, September 4, 1867). The completion of the Central Pacific Railroad in 1869 did not bring forth the expected prosperity; it was, on the contrary, the occasion of widespread unemployment. Lands did not rise in value, the change from steamship to railway transportation caused more workers to be unemployed, freight rates remained inordinately high, and thousands of white and Chinese workers were discharged upon the California labor market. The white working class directed their hostility toward railroads, corporations, and the Chinese.

In an atmosphere of intense anti-Chinese feeling, laws were enacted one after another to limit the political status of the Chinese. The California State Supreme Court held that no Chinese should be permitted to give evidence against any white person; the California legislature rejected the 15th Amendment in denying citizenship for the Chinese; Chinese were excluded from the public schools. A host of municipal ordinances were enacted to narrow the occupational options for the Chinese, e.g., “every laundry employing one horse drawn vehicle was to pay two dollars a quarter license fee, those employing two such vehicles, four dollars a quarter, and those using none, fifteen dollars a quarter.” Since practically all of the Chinese delivered laundry by foot, the discriminatory legislation was obviously directed toward the Chinese. Licenses for the transaction of any business or occupation were denied to any alien ineligible for citizenship. It was also ruled that aliens would be prohibited from taking fish out of any waters of the state for purposes of sale. Ordinances required that laundries must be constructed with stone or brick
walls, and that laundries could not operate between 10 o’clock at night and six in the morning (Sandmeyer, 1939).

The legislation and court decisions made it an open season against the Chinese. A sympathetic editor of the Sonora Flag noted: “Whites have unrestricted license to rob and kill the unfortunate Chinamen. Much as we dislike the Chinamen, they should be protected by the government since they pay a heavy tax to it” (Sonora Flag, February 19, 1863). In LaPorte (June 12, 1868), a news item stated: “Three men were seen who supposedly robbed the Chinese last year. There were more robberies of the Chinese with nothing being done to protect the Chinese. These robbers are protected by law which rejects Chinese testimony.” Another editorial observed that: “Many Chinamen are now engaged in harvesting the potato crop and the robbing of these people must cease. The Chinese are ‘inoffensive creatures’ and the attacks upon them are unwarranted” (Petaluma, December 4, 1869).

### The Urbanization of the Chinese

Congress enacted legislation in 1882 to restrict the immigration of the Chinese except for students, merchants, and government officials. The extreme sex ratio of Chinese males to females prevented the establishment of families and home life in the United States. This was due in part to a California law that prohibited the immigration of a Chinese female without first presenting evidence that her coming was voluntary and that she was a person of “correct” habits and character. Since the decision was in the hands of a single immigration official, the immigration of Chinese women was sharply controlled. The U.S. Supreme Court declared the law prohibiting the immigration of Chinese women to be unconstitutional, but within a few years, the Chinese Exclusion Act (of 1882) provided that there would be a suspension of immigration of Chinese laborers for 10 years. Thus, a laborer who might be able to pay his way across the Pacific was denied entry, and Chinese laborers already in the country could not send for their families as the husband/father’s occupation determined the status of the family members. This fact was to become the cause of great personal difficulty for several years, requiring the Chinese males to travel to and from China for periodic visits.

The crisis in the political economy following the completion of the railroad changed the nature of work engaged in by the Chinese. While a segment of the Chinese labor force continued to work for the railroad in the construction of feeder lines to the Central Pacific Railroad, others began working on land reclamation projects in the rich delta lands and on developing irrigation systems throughout the state, making California one of the more productive agricultural states in the union. The emergence of agribusiness transformed agricultural production and was linked to urbanization, making the city (San Francisco initially) the center for capital accumulation. The Central Pacific Railroad opened up the Midwestern and Eastern markets with the invention of air brakes and refrigerated freight cars to transport
perishables over mountains to Eastern markets in seven to 10 days. Land that was previously planted with grain now produced potatoes, fruits, and vegetables.

Thus, the changing nature of capital accumulation, combined with the creation of the city and with it, small manufactories and the need for service workers, led many Chinese workers to concentrate in San Francisco to pursue new kinds of employment and to seek mutual aid and security from the criminal attacks upon them in rural areas of California.

Census data support the fact of urbanization of the Chinese. In 1860, there were 34,900 Chinese in California, with only seven percent in San Francisco; by 1870, of the 49,270 Chinese, 24% were in San Francisco; and of the 75,000 Chinese in 1880, 29% were concentrated in San Francisco (Sandmeyer, 1939: 19). From their previous work in mining and railroads, the Chinese in the 1880s were employed as domestics, cooks, laundrymen, and in the manufacturing of bricks, slippers, bags, shoes, and cigars (Bureau of Labor Statistics, State of California, 1883–84).

In contemporary Chinatown, the majority of the Chinese work in the service sector—in restaurants and retail trades—or in the garment industry, which primarily employs women. The garment industry employs a preindustrial form of labor exploitation in which labor is bought in the same way as raw materials. Similar to the work of the early Chinese engaged in manufacturing, the quantity of work and the completed commodity take the form of subcontracting at piecework rates (or the “putting out” system employed during the early phases of capital development). The raw materials for slippers, shoes, bags, and cigars were distributed to workers for manufacture in their own homes, through subcontractors. Today, the garment industry in San Francisco’s Chinatown, and probably in other Chinatowns throughout the United States, contracts completed commodities at specified rates with subcontractors, who rent basement facilities and power sewing machines. There, women complete commodities at piecework wages averaging $300 a month while working more than eight hours per day, six days a week. It is the labor process in the garment industry that has made unionization of the workers so difficult. The women workers average $1.50 an hour. However, recent militancy among garment workers—for example, in April 1977, over 10,000 garment workers in 150 cities in the United States demonstrated for security of their jobs—has resulted in contracts in some shops that call for a union wage of $3.42 an hour. The industry is fraught with insecurity, as “runaway” employers have shifted their operations overseas (San Francisco Journal, March 22, 1978).

The Chinese population declined sharply after the enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, reaching a low point in 1920, when there were fewer than 29,000 Chinese in California, of whom 72% lived in urban centers. In 1920, the sex ratio was seven males to each female. By 1960, the situation had been only partially mitigated. The total number of males had climbed to 135,430, but the number of females was 100,654. The 1970 census reports 226,733 males and 204,850 females, the difference existing principally among those 21 years of age and older.
Chinese families long separated by exclusionary laws were finally becoming united following the “liberalization” of the immigration laws in 1965. The Chinese population in the United States increased from 237,000 in 1960 to over 435,000 in 1970. Over 122,000 of this population increase was the result of immigration since 1965 (Urban Associates, 1974).

The Proletarianization of Work in Chinatown

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 not only placed Chinese immigration on an equal footing with that of “preferred” nations, but also established priorities or “preferences” for admissions, largely based on family relationships, under which those now residing in the United States could initiate the document for a visa. Thus, first preference went to “unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens.” (The Chinese in the United States became eligible for citizenship in 1943.) Second preference was for “spouses and unmarried sons and daughters of permanent resident aliens” (San Francisco Chinese Community Citizens’ Survey and Fact Finding Committee Report, 1969; hereafter cited as S.F. Report). The fourth preference specified “married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens,” and the fifth preference was for “brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens” (S.F. Report: 19). Under these guidelines, 10,300 Chinese were admitted in 1967; 62% of the 1967 Chinese immigration to the United States reunited families that had been separated by discriminatory legislation. An overwhelming majority of the new immigrants indicated their intended residence as urban centers, mainly New York City, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Chicago (S.F. Report: 23).

In 1965, just before the influx in immigration, there were 42,600 Chinese in San Francisco and an estimated 30,000 concentrated in the so-called Chinatown North Beach area. The center of Chinatown and the surrounding environs were some of the poorest sections of San Francisco. Examining family income data by census tracts, the median incomes in the core Chinatown area ranged from $4,301 to $4,770. The surrounding areas had slightly higher median family incomes, ranging from $5,392 to $6,296 (S.F. Report: 13–14). By comparing Chinatown with the Mission District, primarily Latinos, and with Hunters Point, primarily blacks, across indicators of quality of life, Chinatown emerges as the poorest section in San Francisco. For example, of the percentages of families with income under $4,000, Chinatown has 40.7%; the Mission District, 31.4%; Hunters Point, 37.2%; and the city as a whole, 21.1%. Male unemployment figures reveal Chinatown and Hunters Point to have the highest unemployment percentages at 11.6%; the Mission District, 10.2%; and the city rate at 6.7 percent. Looking at persons 25 and over with seven years of education or less, Chinatown had 63.8%; the Mission District, 29.4%; and Hunters Point, 30.8%. And the substandard housing rate was highest in Chinatown with 27.3%; the Mission District, 17.6%; and Hunters Point, 9.3 percent (S.F. Report: 14).

The new immigrants since 1965 have settled primarily in Chinatown, exacerbat-
ing the already existing conditions of unemployment, underemployment, housing shortage, and the accompanying conditions of health and welfare problems. The problems in Chinatown were not aggravated by the admission of uneducated and unskilled immigrants; on the contrary, as Table 1 below shows, almost one half of the new immigrants reported professional/technical/managerial occupational backgrounds at the time of immigration (Kwang Ching-Wen, 1976).

Table 1: Comparisons of Occupations of Chinese Immigrants (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional/technical/managerial</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical/sales</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen/operatives</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers/non farm</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service/domestic</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm related</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Though language difficulties may have prevented some immigrants from obtaining work commensurate with prior skills, almost 70% of the immigrant Chinese working in 1970 reported service/domestic work or work in the competitive sector. The “downward mobility” of the Chinese immigrants cannot be attributed to individual pathology. Kwang Ching-Wen examined median family incomes in 1970 by “all Chinese families”: $10,610; and by year of immigration, that is, median family incomes of family heads who immigrated before 1925 compared to family heads who arrived during the period 1965 to 1970, or $7,426 and $7,372 respectively (1976: 29). The data on median family incomes indicate that while a segment of the Chinese population compares favorably with segments in the general U.S. population, there exists a labor force that earns the same wage regardless of the year of immigration. What this means is that the new immigrants are engaged in the same line of work as those who arrived before 1925, which suggests that the “liberalization” of the immigration laws in 1965 essentially admitted fresh labor to replace the worn-out labor power admitted before 1925. To understand this phenomenon, we need to examine the shifts in Chinese population over time.

We noted earlier that following the enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the Chinese population in California declined from 75,000 in 1880 to less than 29,000 in 1920. In Table 2 below, we note that while the Chinese population in the United States did decline overall, their numbers in states other than California increased slightly, with population gains being recorded primarily in the major cities across the United States. The 1920 census indicates that 81% of the Chinese in the United States lived in urban areas. In Table 3, we present data showing the shifts in the Chinese population in the major cities in the United States.
Table 2:
Chinese in the United States: 1880 to 1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>California</th>
<th>Less California</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>105,645</td>
<td>75,132</td>
<td>30,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>107,488</td>
<td>72,472</td>
<td>35,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>89,863</td>
<td>45,753</td>
<td>44,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>71,531</td>
<td>36,248</td>
<td>35,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>61,639</td>
<td>28,812</td>
<td>32,827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>74,954</td>
<td>37,361</td>
<td>37,593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>77,504</td>
<td>39,556</td>
<td>37,948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>117,629</td>
<td>58,324</td>
<td>59,305</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Census.

Although discriminatory legislation and policies may account for the gains and losses in the Chinese population in selected cities across the United States, it does not account for why cities in the same state, for example, Seattle and Spokane, or San Francisco and Oakland, experienced different population changes. Numerically, San Francisco experienced the greatest loss from 25,833 in 1890 to 10,582 in 1910, while some cities (Boston, New York, Chicago, and Oakland) experienced substantial increases over the same period.

Table 3:
Chinese Population in Selected Cities: 1890–1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1890</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1940</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>1,186</td>
<td>1,192</td>
<td>1,075</td>
<td>1,595</td>
<td>1,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>2,498</td>
<td>6,321</td>
<td>4,614</td>
<td>5,042</td>
<td>8,414</td>
<td>12,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>1,165</td>
<td>997</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>1,672</td>
<td>922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>1,209</td>
<td>1,778</td>
<td>2,353</td>
<td>2,757</td>
<td>2,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Orleans</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Antonio</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denver</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt Lake City</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seattle</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>1,351</td>
<td>1,347</td>
<td>1,781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spokane</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portland</td>
<td>4,539</td>
<td>7,841</td>
<td>5,699</td>
<td>1,846</td>
<td>1,416</td>
<td>1,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>1,871</td>
<td>2,111</td>
<td>1,954</td>
<td>2,062</td>
<td>3,009</td>
<td>4,736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakland</td>
<td>1,128</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>3,609</td>
<td>3,821</td>
<td>3,048</td>
<td>3,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>25,833</td>
<td>13,954</td>
<td>10,582</td>
<td>7,744</td>
<td>16,303</td>
<td>17,782</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Lyman (1971: 69).
With the exception of domestic workers, the majority of the Chinese laborers by 1910 were employed by Chinese employers. In San Francisco, general merchandising, including retail food outlets, employed the largest number, 518; the garment industry was next with 292; laundries with 287; and Oriental bazaars (curio shops) with 131 employees. In contrast to the work pattern of the Chinese in the 1880s, they were no longer manufacturing bricks or bags; however, 91 were employed in cigar making, 65 in manufacturing shoes, and 57 in broom making. The Chinese across the Bay in Oakland were essentially engaged in the same type of work (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1910). The 1908 Bureau of Labor Statistics reported only 106 employees in restaurants.

Based upon the work pattern of the Chinese in the San Francisco Bay Area, the transformation from contract labor to wage labor, albeit piece-work wages, resulted in many Chinese returning to their homeland, but many others migrated across the country as the cities became centers for the expansion and accumulation of capital. Since Chinese were excluded from joining industrial labor unions, they were limited to work as domestics, the service and retail trades, and the manufacturing of commodities that employed preindustrial forms of labor process.

The emergence of curio shops is an early indication of “Chinatown” as a place for tourism and local shopping. But it wasn’t until after World War II that Chinatown became a part of San Francisco’s reputation as a tourist and convention center, promoted in part by the publication of autobiographical novels by Pardee Lowe (1943) and Jade Snow Wong (1945), which were guides to Chinatown, Chinese cuisine, and customs, on the one hand, and portrayals of “Americanized” Chinese on the other. The term Chinatown is analytically distinguished from a geographically bounded community of Chinese. Chinatown is not a racial community in the traditional sense. It is glued together and sustained because of its importance to the tourist industry, with linkages to the nearby chain hotels, airlines, and the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce. What this means is that the retail stores and restaurants in Chinatown, which are noted for their reasonable prices, are highly dependent upon a cheap labor force. Census data support this analysis as 21.4% of the Chinese are employed by eating and drinking places, 10 times higher than the percentage of Japanese (Light and Wong, 1975); in New York’s Chinatown, 53% of the adult men and 36% of all working residents are employed in restaurants (Ibid.). Over 34% of the Chinese in the United States are employed in retail trades as compared to 15% for the Japanese and 14% among whites (Ibid.).

In 1976, San Francisco ranked second, behind Chicago, in hosting the number of conventions (United Airlines, March 1978). Thus, the infrastructure of Chinatown is as important to the city’s economy as the natural deepwater ports in Oakland and San Francisco are to the world-system of capitalism. The difference, however, is that Chinatown requires replenishment of fresh labor power. The historical process that set into motion the internationalization of labor back in 1849, combined with the racist restrictions placed upon the Chinese and the transformations of
the labor process, explain the modern proletarianization of labor among the new immigrants.

While median family income, the rate of unemployment, the level of education, and the rate of substandard housing are indicators of poverty conditions, other indicators provide a glimpse of the quality of life in Chinatown. Dean Lan (1971) and Light and Wong (1975) report that the density of 885 people per acre in San Francisco’s Chinatown is 10 times the city’s average. The Chinese in San Francisco have a suicide rate three times higher than the national average; Chinatown has the nation’s highest tuberculosis rate and an infant mortality rate two times higher than the rest of the city. We can cite other statistics on the lack of recreational space, health care facilities, and welfare rates, but they all reveal the grim social conditions behind the facade of a “mysterious and exotic” Chinatown displayed in travel folders compiled by the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce.

These are the conditions that criminologists have long recognized as criminogenic: the poverty, the lack of open space and recreational facilities; the absence of supervision of children in the home caused by the necessity for both parents to work; and, in particular, the inability of the recently arrived immigrant youth to handle their school work and, if they drop out, their inability to find employment, due in part to language difficulties, but more importantly to the fiscal crisis and labor process in Chinatown.

There is some evidence to support the increase of crime and delinquency since 1965, the year in which the new immigrants started coming to the United States. In 1964, one year before the influx of immigration, the San Francisco Police Department arrested or cited 85 Chinese youngsters. The number of arrests and citations increased to 130 in 1965, 137 in 1966, and 186 in 1967. A breakdown of the 1967 data shows that American-born Chinese were arrested or cited twice as frequently as the China-born youngsters. But since 1968, when there were 324 arrests or citations, and 514 in 1969, the ratio of arrest or citation has evened out among the American-born and the China-born juveniles (Krisberg and Takagi, 1972).

Chinese Crime in the Past and Present

National data on Asian-American crime is sparse. The LEAA-sponsored criminal victimization surveys, the National Prisoners Statistics, Children in Custody, and Survey of Inmates in State Correctional Facilities, do not provide official statistics on Asian-American crime, let alone statistics on Chinese crime and delinquency.³

Police departments produce monthly and annual statistics, but typically the data are organized for internal use. Because of these difficulties, we will draw upon studies and data collected on the Chinese in California. While this poses some problems in making generalizations on Chinese crime and delinquency, it should be noted that 39% of all Chinese residing in the United States live in California (36% of the Japanese and 40% of the Filipinos).

The most complete data on Asian-American crime is published by the California
Department of Corrections, the state’s adult prison system. The data are published annually, going back to 1854.\(^4\) In 1973, the latest year of *California Prisoners*, the data on male felons received from courts show 11 Chinese, 11 Filipinos, and four Japanese. Table 4 summarizes the penal commitment of the three Asian groups in California since 1945. Among Japanese and Filipino adult males, there is no discernible pattern of penal commitment. There was a relatively larger number of Chinese penal commitments during the 1950 decade, but the numbers decreased in the ensuing years. Perhaps what is most striking about Table 4 is the apparently “crime free” behavior among Asian-American adult females.

### Table 4:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>1958</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>1964</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>1965</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
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<td>1968</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>1970</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>1971</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>1972</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from *California Prisoners*, Department of Corrections, Sacramento, California.
Table 5:
Birthplace of Prisoners in California Prisons: 1854–1900 (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1854</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>(61.4)</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>(9.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1862</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>(62.5)</td>
<td>(8.7)</td>
<td>(1.7)</td>
<td>(27.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>(66.1)</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>(8.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
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<td>15.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>53.7</td>
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<td>5.0</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>10.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>(69.8)</td>
<td>(5.9)</td>
<td>(0.6)</td>
<td>(23.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>(75.3)</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>(2.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The low crime rate among the Chinese and Japanese has drawn the attention of scholars, leading to several studies being conducted over the years to identify cultural and social factors associated with an apparently “crime free” community. But it was not always this way. Crime among the Chinese, as measured by their proportion in the California prisons, reached alarmingly high rates during the latter part of the 19th century, leading to the following observation at the turn of the 20th century:
The preceding figures indicate that the criminality of the Negro race (33 penal inmates per 10,000 population) is much higher than that of the whites (10 per 10,000), but lower than that of the Indians (55 per 10,000) and Mongolians (Chinese with 38 per 10,000) (Sanborn, 1904: 9).

Sanborn was undoubtedly familiar with California penal statistics, which are summarized in Table 5 below. The table shows that a significant proportion of the California prison population was made up of Chinese.

The “racial” categories employed in Table 5 are not very useful. For example, prisoners categorized under Mexico made up 15.7% of the penal population in 1860, which is 6.5 times higher than their proportion in the general population. In later decades, the percentage of the Mexico group declines, but this does not mean that their proportion in the penal population declined, because the American-born children of this group could be placed under the U.S.-born category. Few of the Chinese established families in the United States, so their proportion in the penal population is undoubtedly accurate, reflecting “crime” among the Chinese.

The Chinese proportion in California prisons peaked from 1881 to 1883, a period during which the U.S. Congress debated and enacted the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. Data are not available on the kinds of offenses committed by the Chinese during this period. The Chinese, however, were not committed to prison for violations of the narcotics laws, because the first state legislation governing control over the use and distribution of opiates was a misdemeanor law enacted in 1881. The relevant penal code Section 307 states:

Every person who opens or maintains, to be resorted to by other persons, any place where opium, or any of its preparations, is sold or given away to be smoked at such place; and any person who, at such place, sells or smokes opium or its said preparations to be there smoked or otherwise used...is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the County Jail not exceeding six months, or both such fine and imprisonment (Penal Code, 1881: 34).

The city of San Francisco passed a municipal ordinance in 1878, making it a misdemeanor to “Keep, maintain, or visit” an opium den (Mark, 1978). It should be noted in passing that of the several publications on the origins of the narcotics laws in the United States, the two that are most familiar to criminologists are Howard Becker’s study of the Marijuana Tax Act (1963) and Alfred Lindesmith’s analysis of the laws governing the addict (1965). Both studies focus upon the 1914 Harrison Act as the beginning of criminalizing opiate possession and its use. Both Becker and Lindesmith recognize that although the Act itself did not make the possession or the use of the drug illegal, it became the basis for a Supreme Court decision, taking the first important step that ultimately led to the outlawing of the addict. As
our analysis of the Chinese experiences in the United States shows, Becker and Lindesmith are wrong. The first laws governing the control of opiates, or more precisely, the Chinese, originated in 1878.

The increase in the proportion of Chinese prisoners during the 1850s and 1860s could be attributed to racist laws that prohibited the Chinese from giving testimony against a white person, but we do not know in what manner racism in the criminal justice process, that is, jury and court bias, and the more general atmosphere of anti-Chinese agitation in the later period, led to their penal commitments. It is quite possible that the Chinese were given longer sentences, thereby contributing to their larger percentage in the prison population.

Explanations of Chinese crimes in the 19th century tended to be anthropomorphic, and it was not until the publication of Walter Beach’s study in 1932 that we begin to see scholarly interpretations of immigrant Chinese and Japanese crimes. Beach’s *Oriental Crime in California* (1932) is based upon official data from the police and the prison system for the period 1900 to 1927. It compares the Chinese and Japanese across counties, age, occupation, and offense categories. We reproduce below in some detail Beach’s conclusions, because he noted not only the low crime rates among the Chinese and Japanese, but also offered a sociological interpretation that, while it varied in emphasis in later works, became the dominant theoretical schema up to the present time. Beach observed that:

the offenses committed by both races (Chinese and Japanese) are gaming, lottery playing, vagrancy, drunkenness, traffic violations, and the breaking of city ordinances.

He went on to conclude that:

it is clear...that there is nothing in the Oriental crime record indicating some special variety of crime which characterizes either the Chinese or the Japanese as racial stocks; nor is there any ground upon which to erect a theory of inborn racial tendency toward types of behavior (Beach, 1932: 63).

Beach’s conclusion is rather remarkable and represents a definite break from the emphasis of the immediate past: biological interpretations based upon IQ studies, the “instinct” assumption in the race relations theory of Robert E. Park (1917), and the racial theories promoted by the social eugenicists.

Beach offered the following interpretation to his findings:

the evidence points to...certain aspects of culture mingling. The problem of adjustment of one culture to another inevitably illustrates the difficulties which arise through misunderstanding, and through the differences in the weight of emphasis which different forms of behavior are given in one culture as compared with another. It is well to understand that custom
and law as affecting human conduct belong, in each case, to a cultural unit or whole, and criminal conduct itself must be studied in relation to the cultural background of the offender. And it is equally evident that the sheer inability of newcomers as strangers in a strange world involves a temporary inability to understand and appreciate the ways and sentiments and attitudes of the life which they have entered. Much of what constitutes the criminal record of the Oriental in California is to be understood only in relation to these facts (Ibid.: 64).

Beach’s culture conflict thesis assumes the relativity of culture, attributing the conduct defined as criminal to the cultural backgrounds of the immigrants. The thesis is turned around in subsequent studies of Asian-American delinquency, attributing the low rate of delinquency to cultural values brought over by the immigrant parents!

While Beach studied crimes among Chinese and Japanese immigrants, later studies focused upon the children of these immigrant families. Chronologically, Andrew W. Lind (1930a; 1930b) and Norman Hayner (1933) were the first to engage in this task. Both Lind and Hayner were influenced by the works of Park and Burgess and Shaw and McKay. Lind mapped out Honolulu, while Hayner studied Seattle, two cities with large Asian American populations. Areas of disorganization were identified by employing indices of juvenile delinquency, crime, suicide, prostitution, etc. Both Lind and Hayner found low delinquency rates in the most “disorganized” areas of the city.

One of the interesting exceptions to Shaw’s findings in other cities was the low rate of (delinquency) in the Bailey Gatzert school district.... The Bailey Gatzert district is a deteriorated section... (with) the highest concentration of homicides, houses of prostitution, unidentified suicides, and cheap lodging houses in Seattle (Hayner, 1933: 319).

Hayner reports that: “Ninety percent of the boys in this school district are Japanese,” and he offered the following explanation:

The low delinquency rate seems to be accounted for by the strong family and community organization characteristic of this immigrant group (Ibid.: 319).

Of the boys who became delinquent, Hayner observed that the residences of the families were outside the ethnic community, and in these cases, Hayner believed that the boy did not come into contact with the racial colony, which provided “the restraining influences...” (Ibid.: 319–321). Lind was equally convinced that residential integration, or what he called deculturization, was responsible for those Asian-American youngsters who got into trouble (1930a: 217). Thus, he concluded:
Mere spatial proximity in the ghetto provides for the effective operation of the old world traditions, habits, mores and institutional controls.

One of the most important functions of the racial colony...is that of providing, during the trying period of readjustment to a new culture and civilization, a haven where the habitual and customary patterns of life are unquestioned and absolute (Lind, 1930b: 208).

Hayner by 1938 was emphatically asserting that cultural factors explained the low delinquency rates among the Chinese and Japanese:

One of the major factors that accounts for the low rate of criminality [is] the integrated families that are characteristic not only of Japan but also of China and the Philippines (1938: 911).

He specified these factors to be filial piety, feelings of kinship, moral discipline, emphasis on courtesy and strong parental feelings of responsibility. Helen MacGill, in a study of Asian-American youngsters in Vancouver, British Columbia, was equally convinced that the explanation of the low crime rate was to be found in the culture of China and Japan:

The explanation seems to lie in the strong family system of both China and Japan, which operates to control and dominate the individual. The family structure has its roots in the religious beliefs of the two nations, for it is based upon and entrenched by ancestor worship.

Inculcated in the children of both nations [sic] is an extraordinary respect for parents and elders, and a strong sense of responsibility for those younger. Obedience is demanded and obtained... (MacGill, 1938: 434).

These early studies not only conveyed the impression of low crime rates among Asian Americans, but also laid the foundation for a culture and personality theory to explain the behavior and conduct of Asian-Americans. The theory assumes that the cultures of China and Japan contain the key elements that shaped and controlled the behavior of Asian-American youngsters and, for whatever the children achieved or failed to achieve, the strategy credits or blames the cultural elements in the mother country.

Since World War II, research on the Asian American community has been dominated by these two theoretical perspectives: assimilation/acculturation inquiries and culture and personality explanations. They were first introduced in the research literature in the study of delinquency by Arthur Lind and Norman Hayner. Thus, as late as 1968, Sollenberger (1968: 22) concluded from a study of San Francisco’s Chinese community that the low delinquency rate among the Chinese is due to their child-rearing practices, their cultural values, and their fam-
ily structure. He also observed that as more and more youth assimilate American culture, delinquency will increase.

We noted earlier that delinquency among Chinese youth in San Francisco, as measured by arrests, was the same for both the American-born and China-born youth. If the arrest rates are the same for both categories of youngsters, it is clear that we cannot invoke the culture conflict thesis advanced by Beach. The thesis might apply to the foreign-born, but not to the American-born. To pursue this a bit further, we present, in Table 6, data on arrests and citations of Chinese and Japanese juveniles.

Table 6:

Juveniles Cited/Arrested in San Francisco
By Race and Sex: January 1, 1976, to June 30, 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beyond Control</td>
<td>516/498</td>
<td>293/222</td>
<td>38/11</td>
<td>0/1</td>
<td>73/29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malicious Mischief</td>
<td>1,033/190</td>
<td>691/136</td>
<td>81/4</td>
<td>4/0</td>
<td>157/37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misdemeanor Property</td>
<td>343/227</td>
<td>479/400</td>
<td>92/50</td>
<td>4/1</td>
<td>95/83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misdemeanor Person</td>
<td>247/43</td>
<td>263/77</td>
<td>65/11</td>
<td>0/1</td>
<td>66/19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felony Property</td>
<td>783/93</td>
<td>1,431/129</td>
<td>110/8</td>
<td>4/1</td>
<td>214/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felony Person</td>
<td>140/21</td>
<td>138/33</td>
<td>16/2</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>5,110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Offenses defined:

*Beyond Control*: Truancy, runaway, incorrigible, loitering and curfew.

*Malicious Mischief*: Drugs, vehicle offenses, disturbing the peace, Sex, and all others.

*Misdemeanor Property*: Petty theft, arson.

*Felony Property*: Robbery, burglary, grand theft, auto theft.

*Felony Person*: Homicide, aggravated assault, rape.

Source: San Francisco Police Department.

While the number of arrests of Chinese juveniles has increased in recent years, it has not for the Japanese. Thus, the prediction that greater acculturation will lead to more delinquency does not explain the case of the Japanese. A tortuous argument could be made that the Chinese have undergone greater acculturation than the Japanese, but this has problems because one-half of the Chinese arrests were suffered by the China-born youngsters. This leads to the awkward proposition that while some Chinese became delinquent through the process of acculturation, others became delinquent because of culture conflict. The proposition is awkward because, according to the culture and personality thesis, it would follow that the China-born youth, being relative newcomers from a society that emphasizes traditional values, ought to be more deeply imbued with those values associated with a low delinquency rate. However we turn and twist the culture and personal-
Behind the Gilded Ghetto

ity thesis, it does not help us to understand the current relative increase in crime among Chinese youth in San Francisco.

Given the dominance of the culture and personality thesis, it could be predicted that it would be applied to explain the several dozen shootings and murders that have taken place in Chinatown. Two recent versions appeared in the pop magazine *Psychology Today* (May 1977). Berkeley Rice, in an article entitled “The New Gangs of Chinatown,” explained:

A large percentage of the new immigrants are teen-agers from Hong Kong, where youth gangs have thrived for years. Once here, many of them end up joining gangs in Chinatown. According to the police, there were no youth gangs in Chinatown before the big wave of immigrants began in 1967 (Rice, 1977: 62–63).

And the noted gang researcher Walter Miller had this to say:

The rise in the number of Asian gangs—primarily Chinese—is one of the most striking developments in recent years. For many years most experts believed that Oriental youth rarely contribute to juvenile delinquency or gang activity. In the 1970s, however, with the surge of immigration of Hong Kong Chinese, the number of Asian gangs has become nearly as numerous as white gangs... (Miller, 1977: 56).

While Rice and Miller did not go so far as to identify cultural features in Hong Kong to explain the formation of youth gangs, they both assume that the increase in crime—the more serious crimes—is associated with gangs. Since it is assumed that gangs did not exist in Chinatown before 1967, the increase in crime is to be attributed to the recently immigrated youth from overseas.

Both Rice and Miller based their articles on information from the police. We turn now to a discussion of law enforcement and their perceptions of Chinese youth as gang members within the context of political repression of the Chinese during the course of the Cold War.

**Law Enforcement, Gangs, and the Cold War**

In some ways crime and delinquency in the Chinese community are quite difficult to assess because of the enormous publicity on the so-called Chinese youth gangs. Media reports on Chinese delinquency are often exaggerated and sensationalized, as are the statements by public officials, primarily the police, including the highest-ranking law enforcement officer of the state, Attorney General Evelle Younger, and until his death, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. In a recent study of a delinquency prevention project in San Francisco’s Chinatown, the researchers report that the people they talked to were most concerned about the “gang” problems of the community (Krisberg and Takagi, 1972).
The media reports, based upon statements by law enforcement agencies, have created an image that crime and delinquency in Chinatown mean youth gangs. An example of how hearsay information leads to a statement of fact is illustrated in a recent LEAA publication by Harvard University criminologist, Walter Miller. Miller’s sources of information are the police and probation office (Miller, 1975: 17). He asserts that there are 1,450 Asian gang members in New York City, representing five percent of the gang members in that city. For San Francisco, he states there are 235 Asian gang members, or 90% of all gang members in the city (Ibid.: 3)! Although the police and police arrest figures represent important sources of information, most responsible scholars use them with great caution, formulating tentative hypotheses for further inquiry. Miller, however, not only used the data for an article in a widely circulated magazine (1977), but also made the following conclusion:

Accepted doctrine for many years has been that Oriental youth pose negligible problems in juvenile delinquency or gang activity; this accepted tenet has been seriously undermined by events of the 1970s, not only by the violent activities of the newly immigrated “Hong Kong Chinese,” but by the development in several cities of gangs of Filipino, Japanese, and other Asian groups (Miller, 1975: 27).

Takagi (1978) contradicts Miller’s conclusions. While Takagi did not investigate crime and delinquency in the Filipino group, he found, in interviews with the police, school officials, and workers in community organizations in San Francisco and Los Angeles, no violent activities, let alone gangs, as a basis for violent crimes in the Japanese, Korean, and Thai communities, as Miller would have us believe.

Miller had previously conducted research on gangs. He warns the reader that information concerning gangs tends to be highly politicized; the kinds of information released by agencies dealing with gangs are frequently exaggerated or presented in such a way to best serve the interests of the particular agency rather than the interests of accuracy (Miller, 1975: 3). Despite this cautionary note, Miller proceeded to violate this dictum by drawing unqualified conclusions from information obtained from the police and the probation office.

In a current study of Chinese delinquency in San Francisco (in progress), we attempted to learn how agencies come to employ the term “gang.” We began by studying the disciplinary process in the San Francisco public schools and learned that school officials use the term gang to handle management problems. From 1972 to 1977, 122 Chinese students were referred to the Student Placement Office, which also serves as the centralized disciplinary unit, and to the Student Attendance Review Board (SARB), a newly created unit to handle truancy cases and other status offenses.

In examining the school referral reports (typically prepared by the Dean of Boys
or Girls) of the 122 cases, the term “gang” is used in 31 cases. A typical report looks like the following:

Date: 12/1/76. 9th grade. Request change of school. Involved in gang type activities. Warned many times. Cited by police on 11/2/76 riding in car in which occupants of the car on an earlier date were involved in an assault. Suspended on 11/4/76 for 5 days for disobeying rules.

This referral to the Student Placement Office is based upon irrelevant and highly prejudicial information to obtain disciplinary action, specifically, a reassignment to another school.

Once a youngster is officially labeled a gang member, it becomes a certainty that the label will be used against him at some subsequent date. To illustrate this point, we examined the total number of Chinese juveniles referred to the Probation Department during the period January 1, 1976, to June 30, 1977. Preliminary analysis shows the labeling of a youngster as a gang member comes primarily from the police, probation officers, and school officials. The school originates 19% of the gang label; the police, 20%; and the probation office, 49%. That almost one-half of the gang references originate out of the probation office suggests the difficulty for the youngster of obtaining a fair and impartial hearing. For those who turn to the police and the probation office for information on gangs, as did Miller, the conclusion is at best a reality constructed by officials.

A compelling reason for being careful and exercising restraint in drawing conclusions about delinquency as gang-related is because it has legal consequences for youth in court. In Wing v. Fare (Acting Chief Probation Officer of Los Angeles County, 1977), a Chinese minor, Wing, was alleged to have committed a robbery. At the adjudication hearing before a referee, the minor did not testify, but two witnesses gave alibi testimony on the minor’s behalf. The prosecution called as a rebuttal witness a police officer who testified that the two witnesses and the minor were active members of the gang. Thereafter, the minor was declared a ward of the court, and his application for a rehearing was denied. The Court of Appeal reversed the conviction. The court held that “the testimony of the police officer concerning the membership of the minor and his witnesses in the gang, which was not based on personal knowledge but on reputation, was inadmissible hearsay, was irrelevant to prove the charged offense, and constituted prejudice to the minor of an irreparable nature...” (Ibid.: 69). Miller and others who do gang research should, if not on scientific grounds, then at least on legal grounds, abstain from publishing interpretations and conclusions about gangs based upon data that come primarily from official sources. Such conclusions contribute “to the exaggerated and sensationalized” accounts of crime in Chinatown as gang-related and preclude alternative interpretations.

All of this is not to deny the existence of crime and delinquency in the Chinese community. A careful analysis of referrals to the probation department reveals that
the majority of offenses follow the typical run-of-the-mill juvenile crimes of theft, burglary, drugs, and school-related offenses. We will analyze and discuss the increase of these juvenile offenses in another section. But we turn now to an analysis of how and why the term gang came to be employed “to explain” Chinatown’s youth problems.

**The Cold War Period**

The turning point was 1949. Until that year, China was an ally of the United States and Japan the enemy. After the China revolution of 1949, a love affair was promoted between the United States and Japan. Politically and militarily, this meant a stable base in the Pacific from which the United States could launch her expansionist policy in the Far East. Hegemonically, Japanese cuisine, architecture, art, film, and culture came to be embraced in the United States, which facilitated the acceptance of Japan as a political ally; it also had consequences for Japanese Americans, as social and legal barriers that previously limited the work pattern of the Japanese were torn down one after another, opening doors for housing, to professional schools, and, most important, to petty bourgeois occupations. This explains the “remarkable” upward mobility of the Japanese in United States (Schmid and Nobbe, 1965).

In an atmosphere of the Cold War, symbolized by “McCarthyism” and the revival of the House Un-American Activities Committee, the Chinese, on the other hand, faced a new wave of anti-Chinese hysteria. This time, the hysteria was based upon fears of sabotage, communist takeover, and infiltration. News items about Chinese in the United States invariably linked them to communism. For example:

**83 Chinese Aliens Arrested inRaids**


**Red Extortion Is Laid to Chinese DailyHerald**

A Chinese Communist newspaper, its editor and its former managing editor were indicted yesterday by a federal grand jury... (New York Times, April 29, 1952).

The federal government continued its assault on the Chinese by preventing Chinese students, who had come to the United States before 1949, from going home. The government feared that their knowledge would be used to develop the People’s Republic of China (Lee, 1951: 307–313). The House Un-American Activities Committee subpoenaed Chinese to testify before the committee, and when the witnesses refused, gave jail sentences for contempt (Congressional Records, 1954: 3254–3257; 6068–6073). The height of repression was reached in 1956, when the Federal Grand Jury in San Francisco issued a subpoena *duces tecum* to
approximately 26 district and family associations, demanding production within 24 hours of all lists, rolls, or other records of the association during the entire period of the association’s existence, all records of dues, assessments, contributions, and other income of the association, and all photographs of the membership!

Although the repression intimidated and repressed progressive political forces in Chinatown, it had the more general effect of legitimizing and consolidating the most reactionary and conservative groups in Chinatown, namely, the pro-Chiang Kai-shek, pro-Taiwan, anticommunist groups. The repression permitted the reactionary groups to gain not only political control of Chinatown, but also to transform the economic base as an appendage of the tourist industry. As we noted earlier, the emergence of Chinatown, although its origins are to be found early in the 20th century, did not fully develop until after World War II.

The anticommunist hysteria did not end with the McCarthy era, as the atmosphere of the Cold War and the escalation of the Vietnam War was exploited by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to point to the “enemy” overseas and their linkages to the Chinese-American communities. On April 12, 1969, Hoover testified before the House Committee on Appropriations. The following was his testimony:

The blatant, belligerent and illogical statements made by Red China’s spokesmen during the past year leaves no doubt that the United States is Communist China’s No. 1 enemy.

We are being alert for Chinese Americans and others in this country who would assist Red China in supplying needed material or promoting Red Chinese propaganda.

For one thing, Red China has been flooding the country with its propaganda and there are over 300,000 Chinese in the United States, some who could be susceptible to recruitment either through ethnic ties or hostage situations because of relatives in Communist China.

In addition, up to 20,000 Chinese immigrants can come into the United States each year and this provides a means to send illegal agents into our nation.

There are active Chinese Communist sympathizers in the Western Hemisphere in a position to aid in operations against the United States (cited in Lyman, 1970: 117).

Hoover continued his attack upon the Chinese when he testified before the same House Committee in 1971:

Red China continues to regard the United States as its chief enemy.... Chinese Communists carry out their intelligence activities through representatives in
the third countries and contacts with sympathetic Chinese Americans. The large number of Chinese entering the country as immigrants provides Red China with a channel to dispatch to the United States undercover agents on intelligence assignments... (S.F. Examiner, July 20, 1971).

Later in the same year, Hoover introduced a new element, linking the smuggling of narcotics to the immigration of the Chinese:

Spy, Dope Links to Chinese Alien Flood

As many as 4,200 aliens from Communist China sneak into the United States every year, and some of the aliens are on espionage missions, and others are involved in narcotics traffic (S.F. Examiner, November 15, 1971).

Hoover’s statements undoubtedly influenced the several dozen law enforcement agencies in California. For example, Bakersfield, California, a small agricultural town with an insignificant Chinese population, was the location of a federal raid.

A raid by federal narcotic agents in Bakersfield was part of an investigation by a federal grand jury into heroin trafficking.... The raid by agents of the Organized Crime Strike Force on a meeting of the Yong On Merchants Labor Association found no narcotics and no arrests were made. The Chinese organization sued for $5 million in damages yesterday (S.F. Chronicle, November 17, 1972).

Hoover’s irrational anticommunism is a matter of record, and one might say that his attack on the People’s Republic of China is in keeping with his past; we cannot, however, simply attribute his charge of the links between Chinese immigration and the smuggling of narcotics to the ravings of an anticommunist. To examine this further, we reproduce in Table 7 the total number of Chinese arrested for violation of the narcotics laws and their proportion to the total arrests.

Table 7:
Total Number of Arrests and the Number of Chinese Arrested For Violations of the Narcotic Law: 1965–1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Arrests</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Percent Chinese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>31,294</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>.0005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>6,927</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>.0009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>81,454</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>.0006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>98,722</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>.0010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>193,743</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>.0003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>167,743</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>.0002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>354,783</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>.0005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>402,265</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>.0007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Asian American Studies Class Project, University of California, Berkeley.
While recognizing the limitations of arrest data, it is nonetheless clear from Hoover’s own agency data that there is no evidence to indicate a change or an increase in the proportion of narcotics violations in the Chinese community. From 1970 until 1971, when Hoover made his accusations of espionage and narcotic trafficking, there was an increase in the number of Chinese arrested, but the proportion arrested remained virtually unchanged compared to previous years.

It would be a serious error to dismiss Hoover as a fool. He undoubtedly had intelligence information on narcotic trafficking at an international level and on Chinese involvement; but his anticommunism blinded him to examining the possibility that it was not the sympathizers and supporters of the People’s Republic of China, but the supporters or members of the pro-Taiwan forces, or the Kuomintang (KMT), who were involved in narcotic trafficking.

The only “big bust” of a Chinese for international narcotic trafficking did not occur in the United States, but in Vancouver’s Chinatown in British Columbia. Ng Sin Lap, also known as Shian Si Wu and Ho Lin Ng, was arrested and convicted in 1975 when he tried to sell a shipment of four pounds of uncut Number 3 heroin, a type commonly produced in the Golden Triangle. Ng is currently serving a 20-year prison term. Ng’s social history is revealing.

Ng was a former officer in the Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang) army division that controls Southeast Asia’s opium-growing Golden Triangle. Ng served as a captain in northern Burma. He came to Vancouver in June of 1970 “to work” for Lam Fong, aged 77, who identifies himself as “The Overseas Affairs Commissioner for Canada,” personally appointed by Chiang Kai-shek. Ng worked for the commissioner for about a year and then went to work for the KMT’s daily newspaper, The New Republic. Ng then became an executive member of the KMT and in this capacity met frequently with trade delegations and with KMT party leaders from Taiwan. Ng was also a member of the Chinese Benevolent Association, an association that is currently locked in a bitter struggle with Chinese Canadians who are critical of Taiwan’s influence on local affairs (San Francisco Journal, March 29, 1978).

We are admittedly on speculative grounds. But what evidence we do have supports our impression that Chinatown is dominated and controlled not only by conservative forces, but also by the presence of the ultra-reactionary KMT group with linkages to Taiwan; that KMT influence in Chinatown is exercised through certain benevolent associations, for example, the Chinese Benevolent Association in the case of Vancouver’s Chinatown; that in one case, at least, a member of the KMT was involved in international narcotic trafficking; and that the legitimation and consolidation of these conservative and reactionary forces in Chinatown stemmed from the U.S. government’s assault on progressive groups in Chinatown.

Emerging Struggle and Police Repression

An axiom in the history of mankind is that no matter how oppressive the conditions or brutal the repression, there emerges resistance, or class struggle, and
Chinatown is no exception. The struggle started in the mid-1960s as a youth movement in response to the material conditions of Chinatown. Although it was based on satisfying human needs, funds for recreation equipment, and job programs for youth, it touched the core of Chinatown’s structural deficiencies. The movement was organized by youth leadership that saw the need for youth groups to work together to meet common needs, rather than competing against one another, either through fighting one another or fighting non-Chinese in the streets of Chinatown and the neighboring North Beach area. They formed the Chinatown Youth Council in 1967 as a self-help organization to raise funds on their behalf. The Wah Ching (literally China-born), consisting of the foreign-born and at that time totally independent of the tongs, was one of the original founding groups of the Youth Council.

The youth became rapidly disillusioned with the Youth Council. As Wayne Yee, one of the organic leaders, remembers: “But we’re not the type who can go to those meetings day after day, week after week. All of a sudden things came in an agenda—old business, new business, priorities, policy. We didn’t understand any of that. It turned us off. We wanted to get down to the truth” (Thompson, 1976: 24). Within one year of the formation of the Youth Council, it was taken over by petty bourgeois college graduates, who understood funding procedures, organizational work, and administrative procedures. The college graduates were able to generate some funds to flow into Chinatown, but most of it went to personnel and staffing and very little of it to the youth. Wayne Yee recalls: “We knew the money was there, but we weren’t getting it. The straight kids were getting it. So we split.... During the next two years a lot of things happened. The street kids were getting frustrated and many were recruited by the tongs” (Ibid.: 24).

Of the several things that happened, one was the formation of Le Way (short for Legitimate Ways), primarily an American-born Chinese organization, designed to be an alternative to the tongs for youth. Le Way opened up a pool hall and soda fountain where the youth of Chinatown could congregate. Perhaps more than any other development at this time, the activities of Le Way brought the police into Chinatown, to sweep the streets clear of youth for tourists.

The analysis in this section comes from two sources: Thompson (1976) and a classified report entitled “Chinese Gang Problem” prepared by the attorney general of California that contains rather candid remarks by police officers on their activities in Chinatowns in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Oakland (Attorney General’s Office, 1972). While Thompson’s article serves as a description of events, the Attorney General’s Report essentially corroborates police action.

Merchants complained that youth were hanging around the entrance to Le Way, blocking the traffic to and interfering with the normal business of the nearby restaurants and retail stores. The Attorney General’s Report, hereafter referred to as A.G. Report, corroborates this analysis. “Our police officers and our photographer would take their wives down dressed as tourists.... They (the merchants) want the police to harass the gang members” (A.G. Report: 33, 34). But the police did not harass
the youth for hanging out on the streets so much as for other reasons. Le Way was organized by left-oriented students, mostly from U.C. Berkeley, and later, a small group broke off to form the Red Guard. Police actions — destroying office furniture, crushing typewriters, and strewing papers about — indicate that the police actually attempted to destroy this political organization, under the guise of investigating a crime (Thompson, 1976: 24). Thus, some Chinatown youth, although not many, who joined Le Way and, later, the Red Guard, were beaten and arrested, typically on charges of assaulting a police officer and resisting arrest. The A.G. Report adds that Le Way and the Red Guard were infiltrated. “We had a man in the Red Guard when they were at their best.... There’s the Asian Legal Services, the Le Way, the Red Guard.... We’ve raided it. We’ve been in and out. When we raided these places, they came out with a pamphlet how we broke down the beautiful gym and how we tore the place apart... (A.G. Report: 28, 36).

In the meanwhile, the Wah Ching continued to look for alternatives to what was available to them in Chinatown. The turning point came when one of their supporters introduced confrontation politics by demanding funds for the youth at a meeting of the Chinese American Citizens Alliance, whose members have familial and other kin ties with the ruling “elders” of Chinatown (Thompson, 1976: 24–25). While confrontation politics might be an appropriate tactic with liberals, in this case it only served to alert the elites of Chinatown that the Wah Ching was to be taken seriously. Thus, when Stanley Wong was elected president of the Wah Ching in 1968, Stanley was brought before the elders of Chinatown and told to cooperate, or resign as president. After Stanley’s family was threatened, he resigned (Ibid.: 25).

At this point, some of the original members of Wah Ching left the organization, among them Joe Fong, who became identified by the police as the leader of the Joe Fong gang. Other members of the original Wah Ching were bought off by the tongs (Ibid.: 25). That the tong(s) recruited youth from the Wah Ching is also noted by the A.G. Report (pp. 9, 15). The name Wah Ching, however, has been assigned by the police to the latter group and represents, according to the police, a gang faction in opposition to the Joe Fong group. There is virtually no information on the Wah Ching, except for the recent conviction of its alleged leader for the murder of his girl friend (S.F. Chronicle, December 6, 1977).

The story of Joe Fong and others who left the original Wah Ching is one of despair and terror. For a while they tried the Police Athletic League, formed in 1970, and then the Chinatown Youth Service Center, a LEAA-funded delinquency prevention project. When neither worked out, they formed a new organization, Yau Lay, to start over again. It did not last very long. According to Thompson, the dissension and collapse was caused by infiltration, intrigue, and strong-arm tactics to destroy the newly formed organization. Shootings, killings, arrests, and imprisonment of its members followed one after another (Thompson, 1976: 25, 76). The A.G. Report is confusing because it uses the term “Wah Ching” without
designating the time period. The report does indicate that the group was infiltrated, but as noted, it is not clear when (A.G. Report: 1).

Closely related, but a somewhat independent development, was the demand by lumpen elements for a share of positions, activities, and funds at the Youth Council and also participation in the moneymaking annual events, such as the Chinese New Year parade. Although there is little documentation on the lumpens, it is our understanding that they were fringe members of the original Wah Ching and the first to accept positions with the tongs. We have been told that even the tongs could not trust them and had run them out of town across the Bay to Oakland. The ascension of the lumpen elements to the Oakland Youth Council, for example, introduced criminal behavior—extortion, strong-arm tactics, and drugs—which came to be attributed to all youth groups. For example, the A.G. Report notes this, but fails to make a distinction among the various youth groupings. “He was the young male leader that was speaking for all the youth. There is government funding on some of these jobs where we have these members that are affiliated with youth councils or street workers or so on. It’s not unusual to find the leader of this group also receiving assistance from the government” (A.G. Report: 17).

A short-lived effort to bring about change in Chinatown came out of an internal struggle within one of the tongs. Seven insurgent members of the tong took matters to court, filing a suit demanding democratic elections within the tong organization. The court ruled in favor of the insurgents, and three of the seven were elected to office. Their first demand was an audit of the books. William Hoo, one of the insurgents, was shot to death in an alley. The police noted that Hoo, the father of two children, was considered an “adviser” to the Joe Fong gang, and his killing was said to be in retaliation for other “gang-related” shootings. Two years later, a juvenile suspect, believed to be an affiliate of the Wah Ching, was arrested and convicted for the murder (S.F. Examiner and Chronicle, October 21, 1977).

The account presented here shows how the youth movement broke off into different groupings and triggered off some of the killings that have occurred. The police explanation that the Golden Dragon massacre is related to youth gang factions is too simple. It denies the historical and material bases for the present structure of Chinatown and the efforts of youth to satisfy the basic human needs of organized play and work. The youth movement was exploited by petty bourgeois, politically naive college graduates on the one hand, and on the other by older critics of Chinatown, who genuinely may have shared the class interests of youth. However, the critics completely underestimated the consequences for youth in challenging the base of power in Chinatown.

The police and the media have mystified the youth problems in Chinatown by invoking the term “gang.” It fails to discriminate youth involved in political activities from those lumpen elements that engage in criminal behavior. Nor does the term discriminate between youth aspiring for a better way of life and those being paid to keep things as they are. Moreover, collapsing the several dozen murders
together with run-of-the-mill delinquencies, and attributing violence to this or that gang, covers up not only the incompetence of officials—police, school, and probation—but also, and more important, the political and economic exploitation of Chinatown’s working class and its accompanying destruction of family and social relations.

As passages in the A.G. Report indicate, the police are aware that organizations in Chinatown are engaged in large-scale gambling (A.G. Report: 2, 3, 8), recruited youth to keep things as they are (Ibid.: 9, 15), and possess information on who was behind the killings. “It was related to me that the majority of these murders up here in Frisco were committed by the older generation who were getting fed up with the operations of the Wah Ching and Yau Li…” (Ibid.: 8).

Despite their understanding of the reality in Chinatown, the major portion of the A.G. Report attempts to link up the gang formation and killings to left groups: the SDS, Black Panther Party, Le Way, and the Red Guard. In this sense, the police have been contributing to the cover-up.

**Summary and Discussion**

The sensational fabrication of a “gang problem” in Chinatown is reminiscent of the “Zoot Suit” riots in Los Angeles. In June 1943, the media and local political figures unleashed a barrage of racist propaganda against the Chicano community, claiming that young thugs (or pachucos) were attacking merchants, avoiding the draft, and refusing to work. Following this publicity, police and off-duty sailors launched a series of brutal attacks on Chicanos, indiscriminately beating anybody who resembled a “zoot suiter” in looks or dress. Subsequent investigations, however, revealed that the “pachuco gang” was largely an invention of the media; that prior to the June riot, there had been a steady decline in the official rate of Chicano delinquency; that most of those arrested in the police sweeps were either in the military, or working in defense plants, or going to school; and that the “zoot suit” was a widely popular fashion, commonly adopted by young whites and blacks, as well as Chicanos. As Jose Montoya has noted:

The historical myth of the *Pachuco* is that they were nothing more than ethnic gangsters who were foreign in their appearance, citizenship, and ideology.... The street fighting of 1943 lasted only one week at the most, but the crime of historical distortion that was set in motion during the war years continues to make a victim of the *Pachuco* (Montoya, 1977).

Racist stereotyping has long been used in the United States to intimidate and discipline new immigrants, as well as to create antagonisms and divisions within the working class as a whole. The “crime of historical distortion” is the rule, not exception, of bourgeois propaganda. With respect to Chinatown, the contradiction between the image of an “exotic” tourist attraction and the reality of sweatshops and
superexploited labor cannot be easily contained. Consequently, from time to time, the bourgeoisie (or its deputies in the marketplace and subalterns in the academy) are required to promote explanations and rationales that make the Chinese workers responsible for their own exploitation. In Chinatown, these attacks have taken the form of characterizing the Chinese as “dope fiends,” or as agents of Peking, or more recently as harboring psychopathic gangs.

Like all stereotypes, there is an element of truth in these accusations and they are not entirely fictitious. For a long time, there were opium dens in Chinatown; some sectors of the Chinese community support the People’s Republic of China and there is a tradition of workers’ militancy in Chinatown. Finally, there is a past history of crime in the community, followed by a low-crime period, and an increase of “street” crime in recent years. But there is no evidence to support the claims that Chinese youth are unusually drug-dependent or are engaged in international drug trafficking, that the militancy in Chinatown is financed by Peking, or that rackets and delinquency are a peculiarly Chinese phenomenon.

The purpose of stereotyping is to divert attention away from the class nature of exploitation and to substitute an explanation that focuses on cultural determinism. In this sense, the Chinese have experienced what is common to the history of all racial and national minorities in the United States.

While anti-Chinese propaganda has its roots in the divisive labor market practices of the second half of the 19th century (which continue to be reproduced today), the particular form taken by this propaganda changes over time. The “dope fiend” mythology, which persisted well into this century, was supplemented in 1949 by red baiting, following the victory of the revolutionary forces in China. The Chinese were of course not the first victims of anticommunism. It had been used, for example, to organize opposition against the railroad strike of the 1870s, the Populists in the 1890s, and the IWW during the early 1900s. After the New Deal, it became the stock weapon of Cold War liberalism, used equally by Republicans and Democrats, corporate leaders and labor bureaucrats. “McCarthyism” was not by any means the sole property of a fanatical senator or the FBI. It was politics as usual (Griffith and Theocharis, 1974). In Chinatown, anticommunism justified purges of progressive leaders during the 1950s and set the stage for sabotage, infiltration, and disruption of youth organizations by the political police during the 1970s.

Of all the Asian communities in California, crime and its related effects are most serious in the Chinese community. Bourgeois criminology has tried to explain Asian criminality—the low rate of the Japanese or the relatively high rate of the Chinese—in terms of culture and personality theory. As we have shown, the law-abidingness of the Japanese, for example, is typically explained in terms of either the compatibility of Japanese and U.S. cultures or the powerfully inhibitory role of the family. The high rate of the Chinese, on the other hand, is explained in terms of culture conflict, that is, as a reflection of the difficulties that immigrants face in becoming assimilated into the “melting pot.”
This theory, in either of its forms, is either tautological or contradicted by the available evidence. The first Japanese immigrants were peasants and farmers, not dissimilar in family structure from the millions of immigrants who came to the United States around the turn of this century from other parts of the world, and their “culture” was hardly compatible with the political economy of industrial capitalism. Moreover, recent Japanese immigrants have a low official crime rate, despite common economic interests shared by Japan and the United States under monopoly capitalism. In contrast, recent Chinese immigrants, coming mostly from Hong Kong to comparable metropolitan centers in the United States, have a relatively high crime rate.

Thus, bourgeois theory is used both unscientifically and opportunistically: when Asians in the United States are law-abiding, it is due to cultural compatibility; when they are criminal, it is due to cultural incompatibility. Grafted onto this irrationality are various racist explanations that attempt, for example, to attribute the drugs and gangs of Chinatown or the lack of delinquency among the Japanese to inborn or culturally derived traits.

In this article, we have attempted to lay the foundations for an alternative analysis of crime in the Chinese community. Toward this goal, we have examined three themes. First, we have analyzed and exposed the ideological roots of racist explanations of Chinese crime. Second, we have suggested that culture-personality theories are refuted by the historical evidence. We do not find this thesis any more compelling as an explanation for Asian-American crime than for black or white criminality. Third, we have tried to carefully distinguish two different kinds of crime in Chinatown: “organized” rackets and violence associated with those who control the political structure and legitimate business; and ordinary “street” crime. The violence so much in the news today has more to do with the former than the latter. As we have pointed out, delinquency is on the increase in Chinatown, and peer group formations among Chinese youth are quite common. Yet there is no evidence to support the argument that the violence is related to youth gangs. Organized violence appears to be related to the business of protection rackets and political intimidation of progressive organizations rather than to an “irrational” youth “subculture.”

Finally, some comments are required about the recent increase in Chinese “street” crime and delinquency, though a full explanation awaits a more precise and thorough investigation. The key to understanding the relatively high crime rate of the Chinese, compared to other Asian groups in California, lies in both the class origins of recent immigrants and the dynamics of superexploitation under monopoly capitalism. With the exception of the Chinese, recent Asian immigrants come primarily from petty bourgeois backgrounds. The Japanese, for the most part, are employees of monopoly capital; Koreans are reported to have an average of 14 years of education; and most Thais come to the United States as students or tourists. The new Chinese immigrants, on the other hand, are primarily from working-class
backgrounds and have settled in Chinatown to be close to family, friends, work, retail stores, and entertainment (Takagi, 1978).

Chinatown is not an ethnic community in the traditional sense of the immigrant neighborhoods of the East Coast and Midwest. Though racially homogeneous, it shares with the *barrio* and ghetto the special characteristics of superexploitation. The structure of present-day Chinatown is the product of over 100 years of brutal labor practices, institutionalized racism, discriminatory legislation, and extralegal repression. On a day-to-day basis, this takes the form of massive poverty, extraordinarily high unemployment rates, and demoralizing social conditions. The root of these problems lies in the labor market practices and labor processes that characterize the capitalist mode of production *in general*. Recent Chinese immigrants to the United States are exposed to a pattern of exploitation that is increasingly a global phenomenon of the capitalist political economy—an attack on the standard of living of the working class in core capitalist nations, the emergence of a worldwide reserve army of labor through “runaway shops,” and the degradation of labor and competency as a result of Taylorization of the labor process (Hopkins, 1977). The poverty of Chinatown is not culturally determined. In fact, as we have suggested, the “downward mobility” of the Chinese is linked to labor market segmentation and the historical process of proletarianization.

Chinatown is not a community of people with common interests and a common cultural background. It does not exist to meet the needs of its residents. Chinatown was created and is sustained by capital to accumulate profit. Its cheap labor force creates superprofits for the garment industry and contributes to San Francisco’s reputation as a profitable convention center. Chinatown is also integrated into other industries—fishing, food processing, and overseas trade—through the redistribution of commodities for retail sales and the conversion of foodstuffs into uniquely Chinese commodities. Chinatown exemplifies in all its forms what Harry Braverman calls the “universal market.” All human activity has been reduced to the cash nexus and transformed into a “giant marketplace” where “relations between individuals and social groups do not take place directly, as cooperative human encounters, but through the market as relations of purchase and sale” (Braverman, 1974: 277).

“Street” crime is growing in Chinatown for the same reasons that it is such a serious problem in black and brown communities (Platt, 1978). With the exception of a very small bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, Chinatown is a community of superexploited labor: women in the sweatshops, men in the restaurants, and able-bodied youths out of work and on the streets. With long hours of work for little pay, both parents working to make ends meet, crowded and inadequate housing, few recreational facilities, and regular police sweeps to keep the streets clear for tourists, it is not surprising that there is an increase in family fights and tensions, and in petty theft and vandalism among adolescents. Under these conditions, individualism replaces reciprocity as the basis of social relations (Harvey, 1972):
It thereby comes to pass that while population is packed ever more closely together in the urban environment, the atomization of social life proceeds apace.... The pressures of urban life grow more intense and it becomes harder to care for any who need care in the conditions of the jungle of the cities. Since no care is forthcoming from an atomized community, and since the family cannot bear all such encumbrances if it is to strip for action in order to survive and “succeed” in the market society, the care of all these layers becomes institutionalized, often in the most barbarous and oppressive forms” (Braverman, 1974: 276–277, 280).

NOTES

1. Chinese labor in the United States has been referred to as “coolie labor,” which means unskilled labor or, in its extreme definition, the lumpen proletariat. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Chinese immigrants were regularly advertised in the Daily Alta California, a San Francisco newspaper, as skilled craftsmen: carpenters, masons, cooks, etc. Although many were “unskilled” in the contemporary sense, they introduced irrigation systems, land reclamation techniques, the growing of rice, citrus fruits, etc.

2. Between 1862 and 1868, there was rapid development of trade unions in San Francisco, the members of which were also members of anti-Chinese societies. Anti-coolie clubs, as they were often called, were formed as early as 1862. But a labor union as an organization did not take an official position until the emergence of the Workingmen’s Party in San Francisco in the 1870s. The Workingmen’s Party was of sufficient influence to call a constitutional convention, which redrafted the state constitution to include sections to severely limit the political status of the Chinese. See, especially, Eaves (1910), Cross (1935), and Saxton (1971). The only labor union welcoming the Chinese for membership was the IWW.

3. See: Criminal Victimization Surveys in 13 American Cities (June 1975); Criminal Victimization Surveys in Eight American Cities (November 1976); Children in Custody (May 1975); Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions (May 1975); and Survey of Inmates of State Correctional Facilities: 1974 (March 1976). All published by LEAA, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

4. Since 1949, prisoner statistics in California appear in California Prisoners, Department of Corrections, Sacramento. The earliest data beginning in 1854 are to be found in the various reports issued by the Committee on Prison Affairs. Beginning in 1880, annual prison reports were issued by the State Board of Prison Directors, Sacramento, California.

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