Insurgent Politics against Authoritarian Neoliberalism

by Alessandro De Giorgi*

In a much-quoted segment from the Prison Notebooks, Italian communist intellectual Antonio Gramsci outlined his famous definition of a crisis of hegemony:

If the ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e., is no longer “leading” but only “dominant,” exercising coercive force alone, this means precisely that the great masses have become detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer believe what they used to believe previously. The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear. (Gramsci 1971, 276).

Although Gramsci’s theorization was a critique of the specific historical conjuncture that supported the rise of European fascisms in the 1930s, the materialist lens he forged provides an invaluable tool to understand the cyclical crises of hegemony that have affected Western capitalist societies through the twentieth century. In the notes that follow, I would like to argue that the “great variety of morbid symptoms” characterizing the present historical moment—specifically, the rise of right-wing populisms across the Western world—signals a crisis of hegemony of the neoliberal regime of capital accumulation sustained by liberal/centrist political parties and a rearticulation of class power along authoritarian lines.

The recent emergence of right-wing populist formations in Europe—the National Front in France, Golden Dawn in Greece, the Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands, Jobbik in Hungary, Alernativ für Deutschland in Germany, the UK Independence Party in England, and of course Trump Republicans in the US—is the latest development in this process of reconfiguration of race and class politics. Yet, despite the appeal that such a label may hold in the face of increasingly autocratic and chauvinistic tendencies in the Western world, we should be wary of calling these developments simply as a form of neo-fascism, or fascism 2.0. Indeed, there are several risks implicit in adopting such a rhetoric: (a) it is a rather ahistorical simplification that prevents a structural analysis of current tendencies; (b) it equalizes all opposition (reformist vs. radical, institutional vs. grassroots) under the generic umbrella of liberal-democratic resistance; and (c) it constricts opposition within a purely reactive mode (i.e., it obstructs the effort to envision not just a less fascist neoliberal society, but a radically different one). A more useful frame of analysis might be what radical political economist Ian Bruff has recently called “authoritarian neoliberalism.” In opposition to the “liberal neoliberalism” endorsed by the centrist parties that have been hegemonic in Europe and the US in the last few years, “authoritarian neoliberalism” is characterized by the fact that

dominant social groups are less interested in neutralizing resistance and dissent via concessions and forms of compromise … favoring instead the explicit exclusion and marginalization of subordinate social groups through the constitutionally and legally engineered self-disempowerment of nominally democratic institutions, governments, and parliaments. (Bruff 2014, 116)

In this sense, whereas liberal neoliberalism à la Obama preempted substantive democracy under a thin veil of democratic rhetoric—let us not forget that cases of police brutality spiked under the friendly Obama administration, and of course immigrant deportations reached the unprecedented number of 2.5 millions—authoritarian neoliberalism à la Trump obliterates formal democracy, too, behind a thick cloud of populist rhetoric. The political vocabulary through which authoritarian neoliberalism articulates its hegemony is that of authoritarian populism famously described by Stuart Hall (1985): a political discourse based on an abstract notion of “the people” that establishes a rhetorical convergence between the objectives of those in power and the demands of the citizenry by channeling both against various undeserving “others” (e.g., criminals, immigrants, terrorists, welfare queens, etc.). This narrative combines different strategies to neutralize the formation of interracial/class-based solidarities:

(a) First, it artificially elevates certain social groups rhetorically constructed as deserving (on the basis of race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, sexuality) above other social groups with whom they share a common subordinated class position in society. The concept of comparative racialization proposed by Lisa Marie Cacho is particularly useful here:

Ascribing readily recognizable social value always requires the devaluation of an/other … In the United States, human value is made legible in relation to the deviant, the non-American, the non-normative, the pathologized, and the recalcitrant. (Cacho 2012, 18–19)

(b) Second, authoritarian populism denounces the undue advantages (e.g., wasteful welfare, reverse discrimination, permissive rights, lax borders, tolerant law enforcement) supposedly enjoyed by the more underprivileged groups at the hands of a self-serving liberal power elite.

(c) Third, it equates—in a sort of zero-sum game—the improvement of social conditions for the deserving social groups with the cultural/political/institutional marginalization of the undeserving social groups (e.g., through criminalization, discipline, surveillance, deportation).

In this context, cyclical moral panics—triggered by political elites and amplified by corporate media—pave the ground for authoritarian law-and-order by equating street crime with a threat to the personal safety of law-abiding citizens by the racialized poor; illegal immigration with a threat to the social mobility of working Americans by criminal aliens; terrorism with a threat to American values by enemy civilizations; welfare with a threat to taxpaying Americans by an irresponsible underclass; and LGBTQ rights with a threat to the stability of the American family by pathological subcultures.

What kind of opposition can we envision in the current conjuncture? Inspired in particular by some of the insights put forward by Keeanga Yamahtta-Taylor (2016), I briefly outline below what I see as the minimum necessary building blocks of insurgent politics in the present moment:

(a) First, social movements should work towards overcoming the single-issue orientation of most current politics and, most importantly, the “non-profit industrial complex” that sustains this paradigm of political action (including forms of “professional activism”).

(b) Second, we should overcome any simplified and depoliticized notion of privilege as an individual feature that subjects can somehow un-learn—for example, by adopting proper “technologies of the self” (Foucault 1988). This also means overcoming the self-congratulatory rhetoric about individual trajectories of healing, awakening, self-care, etc. These models are not only compatible with the dominant neoliberal ethos of personal responsibility and individual achievement, but they are building blocks of its renewed hegemonic hold.

(c) Third, we should be wary of the creation of institutionally coopted (if not state-sponsored) “safe spaces” that end up reinforcing dominant notions of safety as personal security from individual aggressions; particularly when promoted or coopted by institutions eager to prevent insurgent mobilizations (e.g., university campuses), such spaces may become tolerated reservations for injured identities that work effectively to soften any opposition to structural inequalities. Liberated spaces are not assigned by powerful institutions; they are taken from them.

(d) Finally, against the proliferation of court-actionable claims to “injured statuses” as the main form of resistance to white supremacy, we need to build intersectional communities of struggle: we need to engage in political action that acknowledges and organizes the plural nature of our movements, while at the same time consolidating stable political formations tasked with carrying forward the unique cause of the construction of the common. In this project, oppressed identities (the ones imposed by racial capitalism) must become visible against the color-blind nature of contemporary racism, the gender-blind nature of contemporary sexism, and the class-blind nature of contemporary capitalism. However, the ultimate aim of our insurgent politics should be the abolition of any “identity as property” (to paraphrase Cheryl Harris)—that is, liberation from identity as an organizing principle of any social hierarchy. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2009, 331) frame this idea in terms of a distinction between mere emancipation, which is still anchored to the dominant framing of identity, and liberation, which requires instead a complex articulation of singularities. It is in this sense that Frantz Fanon (1967, 8) notoriously advanced the controversial statement “I propose nothing short of the liberation of the man of color from himself”.

In conclusion, against the abstract and amorphous notion of “the people” invoked by authoritarian populism, at the same time uncritically undifferentiated and profoundly divided, we should mobilize the concrete reality of insurgent singularities fighting at the same time against a multiplicity of intersecting oppressions and toward the common goal of a post-capitalist society.

Bruff, I. 2014. “The Rise of Authoritarian Neoliberalism.” Rethinking Marxism, 26(1): 113–29.
Cacho, L. M. 2012. Social Death: Racialized Rightlessness and the Criminalization of the Unprotected. New York: New York University Press.
Fanon, F. 1967. Black Skin, White Masks. New York: Grove Press.
Foucault, M. 1988. “Technologies of the Self.” In Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, edited by L.H. Martin, H. Gutman, and P. Hutton, pp. 16–49.  Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
Gramsci, A. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers.
Hall, S. 1985. “Authoritarian Populism: A Response to Jessop et al.”. New Left Review, 151: 115–24.
Hardt, M. and A. Negri 2009. Commonwealth. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
Yamahtta-Taylor, K. 2016. From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation. Chicago: Haymarket Books.

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*Alessandro De Giorgi is Associate Professor at the Department of Justice Studies, San Jose State University (e-mail: His teaching and research interests include critical theories of punishment and social control, urban ethnography, and radical political economy. He is the author of Rethinking the Political Economy of Punishment: Perspectives on Post-Fordism and Penal Politics (Ashgate, 2006). Currently, he is conducting ethnographic research on the socioeconomic dimensions of concentrated incarceration and prisoner reentry in West Oakland, California.

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Image: “Liberate the commons,” © Social Justice.

Obamacare Survives but Its Future Remains Uncertain

by Tom Bodenheimer*


Photo by LaDawna Howard, used under CC BY 2.0.

March 24, 2017 marked seven years and one day since the signing of the Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”) into law on March 23, 2010. On that seventh anniversary, House Speaker Paul Ryan abandoned the Republican plan to repeal and replace Obamacare because of a shortage of Yes votes. Whereas this was a great victory for those of us who believe that health care is a right, the fate of Obamacare is not yet settled. Because of rising costs to patients, Obamacare could collapse under its own weight. In the short run, we need to take action to reduce patients’ health care costs; in the long run, only a single payer system can fix Obamacare.

Speaker Paul Ryan’s Plan

The now-defunct Republican plan to repeal and replace Obamacare targeted both portions of the Obamacare law: 1) the individual mandate, which requires people without insurance to purchase insurance—assisted by a federal subsidy—or pay a penalty; and 2) the expansion of Medicaid. First, the Ryan plan eliminated the requirement that people without insurance sign up for individual health insurance offered through federal or state-based insurance exchanges. This requirement was needed to encourage young, healthy people to purchase health insurance because they subsidize insurance for older people and people in poor health. In place of the requirement to purchase health insurance, the proposed legislation provided tax credits to help people afford health insurance. However, the tax credits were small compared with the subsidies provided under Obamacare, meaning that many people would be unable to afford health insurance. Lower-income middle-aged people would have their insurance premiums increase from $1,700 under Obamacare to $14,600 under Ryan’s plan. Insurers would be able to increase patient out-of-pocket costs (deductibles and copayments) beyond the levels allowed under Obamacare. Savings from reductions in health care costs under the Ryan plan would largely go to tax cuts for the very wealthy.

Second, Ryan’s plan would have eliminated Obamacare’s expansion of Medicaid that insured 10 million new people. With the attack on both the individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that 24 million people would lose their insurance under Ryan’s legislation.

The Problems of Obamacare

Now that Obamacare will continue to be the law of the land, what are its future prospects?

The individual mandate is under the control of insurance companies; they can choose to participate or not, and they can raise their premiums if they are not making profits. Three of the largest insurers are pulling out of Obamacare in a number of states, leaving people fewer choices. The 2017 premiums are up an average of 22%, more in some states and less in others. From 2015 to 2017, the percent of insured Americans having trouble affording their health insurance premiums (even with the Obamacare subsidies) rose from 27% to 37%. The percent finding it difficult to afford copays for doctor visits and prescriptions has risen from 24% to 31%, and 43% of insured persons, up from 34%, have trouble paying the deductible.

If costs to patients continue to rise, more and more people may opt to pay the penalty rather than purchase health insurance. If many young healthy people decide not to continue their Obamacare coverage, it could have disastrous consequences. Here’s why: Older adults pay premiums that do not fully cover their medical expenses, while younger adults pay premiums that more than cover their expenses. For the system to work, young people need to enroll in sufficient numbers to produce a surplus in premium revenues that can be used to cross-subsidize the deficit created by older people. If many younger people do not renew their insurance coverage in late 2017, premiums will again rise rapidly and more people will be unable to afford health care. While the Congressional Budget Office does not think this will happen—it could.

The Medicaid expansion portion of Obamacare is highly successful. In the 32 states that expanded Medicaid, everyone below 133% of the federal poverty line receives insurance—in most states with minimal out-of-pocket costs. However, a number of states, for example Indiana when Mike Pence was governor, started to charge premiums and copayments to people who have very little money. If they do not pay, they are kicked off Medicaid. The Republican Congress is likely to introduce new legislation, specific to the Medicaid portion of Obamacare, that severely limits the amount of Medicaid funds available to states for their Medicaid programs (so-called block grants or fixed sums per Medicaid enrollee). Such legislation would cause states to cut benefits to Medicaid enrollees and/or burden them with out-of-pocket costs that they cannot afford. Whether or not the attack on Medicaid will pass the Senate depends on whether Republican governors, who would lose federal money from the Medicaid block grants, put pressure on their Republican senators to vote No. If all Democrats oppose this legislation, it takes only three Republican senators to join them in voting No to defeat these cutbacks.

Options for Improving Obamacare

Over the past few weeks, thousands of people made their voices heard: Do not repeal Obamacare. But those voices could turn against Obamacare if costs continue to climb. Democrats need to introduce legislation to reduce the premiums, copayments, and deductibles under Obamacare. It won’t be easy given the realities of the insurance market. What are the options?

1) Increase the subsidies to reduce premium costs, making it more affordable for young healthy people to enter the insurance market.
2) Add a public option insurer that offers lower premiums, copayments, and deductibles than private, for-profit insurers.
3) Join Bernie Sanders and push for a single-payer system that eliminates the insurance industry from health care and provides excellent coverage for all Americans, financed by a progressive tax.

None of these options are likely in a Republican-controlled federal government. But states could enact legislation—ideally instituting a single-payer system—to address Obamacare’s shortcomings. Without confronting the growing costs of health insurance and health care, the future of Obamacare is uncertain.

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*Tom Bodenheimer is a primary care physician who practiced in San Francisco’s Mission District for 32 years. He is currently Professor Emeritus of Family and Community Medicine at University of California, San Francisco.

Trump, DeVos, and the Future of Education

by Sylvia Mac*


Image: “Protest of Betty DeVos,” by Victoria Pickering, used under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. Edited.

Since announcing his campaign, Trump has used a rhetoric that has proven to be divisive and harmful in very real ways to black and brown, immigrant, and LGBTQ students across the country. The days after his election were particularly dangerous for these students. In just the ten days after the election, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) reported nearly 900 hate incidents in almost every state. The report notes that this number is undoubtedly lower than the actual count, since it does not include online harassment and many incidents go unreported. The report also found an unsettling, if not surprising, trend in the reports of violence and harassment: K-12 schools and college campuses were among the most frequent sites of these hate incidents. From creating toxic school environments to pushing for the privatization of public schools, Trump is ensuring that marginalized students will only become more marginalized.

The study revealed that anti-immigrant harassment was the most frequently reported, followed by anti-black and anti-LGBTQ. In Washington state, students chanted, “Build a wall!” in the cafeteria. In California, some students brought “deportation letters” to their classmates. In Colorado, middle school students told Latinx classmates, “Not only should Trump build a wall, but it should be electrocuted (sic) and Mexicans should have to wear shock collars.” Teachers have been on both sides: some the subject of harassment, others the ones harassing. A Muslim teacher who wears a headscarf found a note left in her Georgia classroom stating that her headscarf “isn’t allowed anymore.  Why don’t you tie it around your neck and hang yourself with it?” Conversely, in LA a teacher was recorded telling student she could have them deported because “I have your phone numbers, your address, your mama’s address, your daddy’s address; it’s all in the system, sweetie.” Black students were the target of a teacher in Florida who told them, “Don’t make me call Donald Trump to get you sent back to Africa.”

Although bullying in schools is nothing new, school psychologists, teachers, and parents report overwhelming anxiety in students, as well as an increasingly negative atmosphere in schools since the election. Over 10,000 teachers, administrators, and others who work in schools responded to an online survey as part of SPLC’s Teaching Tolerance Project in the days after the election. Ninety percent of respondents reported that their “school climate [had] been negatively affected,” citing students’ anxiety about the future of their families, the increased use of hateful and derogatory language, the appearance of images of swastikas and confederate flags, and even assaults on students and teachers.

Unfortunately, some students are following Trump’s lead in using racist, sexist, xenophobic, and homophobic language under the guise of not being “politically correct.” Educators report emboldened displays of bigotry, such as students holding up a Confederate flag during the pledge of allegiance at a school assembly in Arizona and students in Minnesota writing things such as “send the Muslims back because they are responsible for 9/11” on their assignments.

The recent confirmation of Betsy DeVos as Education Secretary further undermines any confidence that marginalized students might fare better in the days to come—even if educators were able to turn around the toxic environment in schools. DeVos considers herself qualified to lead the Department of Education despite the stunning lack of understanding of public education she demonstrated in the confirmation hearing and in her written responses to a questionnaire. She appeared not to understand the difference between student growth and proficiency, became “confused” about federal law supporting students with disabilities, and inflated the graduation rate of students in virtual charter schools.

Betsy DeVos has a history of championing school choice and privatization through her political action committee, All Children Matter, and her work with the American Federation for Children. She is among many who frame the neoliberal push for privatization of public school under public-friendly themes such as “racial justice” and “empowerment” through “choice.” This is a rhetoric that invokes “race” but fails to examine underlying systemic racial inequalities. Privatization of public schools has proven to benefit not poor students of color, but only hedge funds and others, such as JP Morgan and Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg, who invest in them.

Writing for the Huffington Post in 2014, Alan Singer of Hofstra University argues that hedge funds and corporations that invest in privatization efforts can sometimes expect to double their investment in just seven years thanks to various tax credits.  These credits can be added to other tax breaks, such as the New Market Tax Credit as reported by Juan Gonzalez. Gonzalez notes that “wealthy investors and major banks have been making windfall profits using a little-known federal tax break to finance new charter school construction.” The New Market Tax Credit allows “a bank or private equity firm that lends money to a nonprofit to build a charter school can receive a 39% federal tax credit over seven years.” We’ve also seen charter schools horribly mismanage this money. In April 2015, the Center for Popular Democracy released a report citing “millions of dollars of new alleged and confirmed financial fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement in charter schools…bringing the new total to over $200 million.”

Research shows that charter schools and vouchers have done little to even the playing field or to desegregate highly segregated urban schools. In fact, in 2010, the UCLA Civil Rights Project commissioned a large-scale study that included 40 states, the District of Columbia, and several metropolitan areas. The results showed that charters are just as deeply segregated as their traditional public counterpart.  Additionally, on the whole, there is no evidence that charters perform better than traditional public schools. Despite DeVos’s insistence that virtual charters are beneficial alternatives, research shows that students at cyber charters consistently underperform. Similarly, vouchers, which provide public money for students to attend private schools, have produced mixed results in furthering student success and achievement. Indeed, vouchers began as a way to circumvent federal mandates to desegregate schools and are now predominantly used by white, middle-class families to send their children to private (sometimes religious) schools, while students of color are left out.

The days following Trump’s election have proven to be contentious, even dangerous, for marginalized students across the United States. Schools have become sites of hate, bigotry, harassment, and violence where students of color, immigrant students, and LGBTQ students do not feel safe. Trump has chosen an Education Secretary so unqualified and so controversial that Vice President Pence had to cast the tie-breaking vote to confirm her. The neoliberal agenda to create an educational marketplace where students are commodities will further the marginalization of students while hedge funds and corporations will continue to reap all the benefits. Trump has ensured that schools will benefit primarily white, middle to upper class, heterosexual students, leaving the rest to join the many other vulnerable groups that will suffer the consequences of his election.

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References and Further Readings
Gooden, M., Jabbar, H., & Torres, M. 2016.  Race and school vouchers: Legal, historical, and political contexts. Peabody Journal of Education (91): 522–36.
Lipman, P. 2011. The New Political Economy of Urban Education: Neoliberalism, Race, and the Right to the City. New York: Routledge.
Ravitch, D. 2013. Reign of Error: The Hoax of the Privatization Movement and the Danger to America’s Public Schools. New York: Random House.

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*Sylvia Mac is an Assistant Professor of Education at the University of La Verne. Her research interests include neoliberalism, market-based school reform, and the intersection of disability, race, and class.


Trumpism, 21st-Century Fascism, and the Dictatorship of the Transnational Capitalist Class

This post is part of a series on the possible impacts of Trump’s election on a variety of social justice issues. Click here to read more.

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by William I. Robinson*

Donald Trump is a member of the transnational capitalist class (TCC). His vast business empire spans several dozen countries around the world. Much of his “populism” and anti-globalization discourse has to do with demagogy and with political manipulation in function of the electoral campaign. Trumpism and the specter of 21st-century fascism must be seen as a response to the crisis of global capitalism. Trump’s global business empire could not flourish without capitalist globalization and without the super-exploitation of immigrant workers in the United States.

The TCC and Trump himself depend on immigrant labor for their capital accumulation and they do not intend to do away with a labor force that is bonded due to its being undocumented rather than “legal.” His electoral promise to deport 10 millions undocumented immigrants, now reduced to some three million, and his proposals to intensify the criminalization of immigrants are, on the one hand, an attempt to convert the immigrant population into a scapegoat for the crisis and to channel the fear and insecurity among the (majority white) working class against the immigrant community rather than against the system. On the other hand, the dominant groups have been exploring ways to replace the current system of super-exploitation of undocumented immigrant labor with a mass “guest worker program” that would be more efficient in combining super-exploitation with super-control.

Trump (and more generally the TCC) seek to place downward pressure on wages in the United States in order to make US workers “competitive” with foreign workers. The downward leveling of wages across countries and the “race to the bottom” has been a general tendency under capitalist globalization that Trumpism certainly intends to continue, now with the justification of making the US economy “competitive” and “bringing jobs back home.”

We cannot under-emphasize Trumpism’s extreme racism, but we need to deepen our analysis of it. The US political system and the dominant groups face a crisis of hegemony and legitimacy. Racism and the search for scapegoats is one key element in their efforts to face this crisis. At the same time, major sectors of the white working class have been experiencing social and economic destabilization, downward mobility, heightened insecurity, an uncertain future, and accelerated “precariatization”—that is, ever more precarious work and life conditions. This sector of the working class has historically enjoyed the ethnic-racial privileges that come from white supremacy vis-à-vis other sectors of the working class, but it has been losing these privileges in the face of capitalist globalization. The escalation of veiled (coded) and also openly racist discourse from above is aimed at ushering the members of this white working class sector into a racist and a neo-fascist understanding of their condition.

Trumpism’s veiled and at times openly racist and neo-fascist discourse has legitimized and unleashed ultra-racist and fascist movements in US civil society. I have been writing about the danger of “21st century fascism” as a response to the escalating crisis of global capitalism. The response to this crisis was the rise a neo-fascist Right in both Western and Eastern Europe, the vengeful resurgence of a neo-fascist Right in Latin America, and the turn towards neo-fascism in Turkey, Israel, the Philippines, India, and elsewhere. One key difference between 20th-century fascism and 21st-century fascism is that the former involved the fusion of national capital with reactionary and repressive political power, whereas the latter involves the fusion of transnational capital with reactionary political power. It is crucial to stress that Trumpism does not represent a break with capitalist globalization, but rather a recomposition of political forces as the crisis deepens.  If we want to understand political phenomena we must not confuse surface appearance (or discourse) with underlying essence (or structure).

Trumpism represents an intensification of neoliberalism in the United States that assigns a major role to the state in subsidizing transnational capital accumulation in the face of stagnation and overaccumulation. For example, Trump’s heralded proposal to invest one trillion dollars in infrastructure, when we examine it closely, is in reality a proposal to privatize public infrastructure and to transfer wealth from labor to capital by way of corporate tax breaks and subsidies for the construction of privatized infrastructural works. We can expect under the Trump regime an effort to further privatize what remains of the public sector, including schools, veterans affairs, and possibly social security, along with deregulation and a further transfer of wealth from labor to capital through corporate tax cuts and austerity.

It is a mistake to view 21st-century fascism as a political development outside of the “normal” progression of global capitalism. Global capitalism faces an unprecedented crisis of social polarization, political legitimacy (hegemony), sustainability, and overaccumulation. The TCC has accumulated trillions of dollars that it is finding ever harder to “unload.” In recent years it has turned to mind-boggling levels of financial speculation, to the raiding and sacking of public budgets, and to what I call militarized accumulation—that is, to endless cycles of war, destruction, and reconstruction; to “accumulation by repression” (building of private prisons and immigrant detention centers, border walls, homeland security technologies, etc.); and to the construction of a global police state to defend the global war economy from rebellions from below.

Trump’s electoral base among the white working class will discover very early on in his regime that his promises were a hoax. How will their rage be contained? Will they be recruited into projects of 21st-century fascism? Political and economic elites in the United States (and worldwide) are currently divided and confused. But if and when the mass of humanity, the global working class, will pose a challenge to TCC control, the dominant groups will unite to defend their rule. The liberal elements among the transnational elite will be unlikely to object to 21st-century fascism in political power if that is what it takes to beat down challenges from below and to maintain control. I fear we are before the gates of hell. There will surely be massive social upheavals from below, but also an escalation of state and private repression.

The spiraling crisis of global capitalism has reached a crossroads. Either there is a radical reform of the system (if not its overthrow) or there will be a sharp turn to a 21st-century fascism. The failure of elite reformism and the unwillingness of the transnational elite to challenge the predation and rapaciousness of global capital have paved the way for the far-Right response to crisis. In the United States, the betrayal of the liberal elite is as much to blame for Trumpism as are the far-Right forces that have mobilized the white population around a program of racist scapegoating, misogyny, and the manipulation of fear and economic destabilization.

Critically, the political class that has been in place for the past three decades is more than bankrupt—it is feeding the turn to the far Right. Its brand of identity politics has served to eclipse the language of the working and popular classes and of anti-capitalism. It has served to derail ongoing revolts from below, to push white workers into an “identity” of white nationalism, and to help the neo-fascist right organize them politically.

A global rebellion against the TCC has been spreading since the financial collapse of 2008. Wherever one looks there are popular, grassroots, and leftist struggles and the rise of new cultures of resistance. Can we beat back the threat of 21st-century fascism? Our efforts must involve analytical clarity as to what we are up against. Trumpism is not a departure from, but an incarnation of an emerging dictatorship of the transnational capitalist class.

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* William I. Robinson is Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is also affiliated with the Latin American and Iberian Studies Program and with the Global and International Studies Program at UCSB. His scholarly research focuses on macro and comparative sociology, globalization and transnationalism, political economy, political sociology, development and social change, immigration, Latin America and the Third World, and Latina/o studies.
An earlier version of this article (in Spanish) was published by La Jornada on December 4, 2016 (here).

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Header image (left) by Joe Brusky, used under CC BY-SA 2.0 / Cropped and modified.

Study for Struggle: Weaponizing Theory for the Fights Ahead

This post is part of a series on the possible impacts of Trump’s election on a variety of social justice issues. Click here to read more.

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by Rachel Herzing & Isaac Ontiveros*

The election of Donald Trump to the office of President of the United States set off a chain reaction among Left organizers and activists across the country. The responses were immediate and forceful. Disbelief was one of the primary reactions we witnessed via social media, informal conversations, and in-person meetings. Many people expressed grief and despair. Others, fear and dread. Still others, anger and outrage. And still others said, “I told you so.” Many took to the streets to express themselves collectively in what was sometimes a cacophony of perspectives and voices.

Nearly as immediately, we saw the release of platforms and statements. We received notices about online fora, trainings, and presentations. We heard about community meetings covering everything from strategies for making one’s church, campus, etc. a sanctuary space, to ways to protect organizers and activists from increased surveillance, to strategy sessions preparing for the 2018 elections.

In the wake of November 8th’s result, at the Center for Political Education we scoured the news, participated in online and in-person community meetings, and set ourselves to studying the range of post-election analysis circulating. We also met one-on-one with local community and political organizations to understand their current campaigns and projects, political education programs and needs, and to continue our ongoing work of understanding how we might support local groups to apply strong theory and analysis to their work on the ground. That ongoing effort has been strongly affected by the reactions of our community partners to what they see as the shifting context in the post-election era.

Many of our comrades and allies, and the communities with which they work, are spinning. Some are fearful of mass deportations, a Muslim registry, the repression of dissent and the expansion of surveillance apparatuses, and the rollback of gains made in recent years. Some are forecasting and preparing for the rise of fascism, the Alt-Right, militias and vigilantism, and the evisceration of social safety nets that have offered the slimmest relief for poor and working class communities and communities of color in both urban and rural areas. Still others are worried about environmental calamity, increased privatization, isolationism, and increased hostilities with international players. Many of our partners are also springing into action to analyze the conditions, plan strategies, and shore up defenses.

In considering the landscape on which the Left will organize, a series of questions emerge. Who is the Left being used as the point of reference here? In assessing what the Left should do, who the Left should mobilize, or how it should increase its ranks, what is the starting place for forging alliances and alignment? This question seems particularly pertinent given a steady stream of exhortations to expand our bases and forge alliances and coalitions with workers, liberals, or Democratic centrists. But with whom do we understand ourselves to be beginning these building efforts? What steps should be taken to align our understandings of the current context, goals about priority targets, and the best means and timeframes in which to attempt to shift power? While certainly this is a unique period in some senses, what lessons could be drawn from history to inform how we fight tomorrow? What are the best tools to apply toward these ends?

In our own reflection at the Center for Political Education, we found ourselves asking, will the Trump regime affect people’s abilities to think clearly? Will the fear so many are expressing about what will happen under the Trump administration lead to retreat and paralysis? Will it ignite frenetic activity that cuts corners on rigorous analysis in favor of rapid action? How may we best balance people’s real sense of fear and urgency with the need for methodical, rigorous analysis and strategic thinking? What roles are we carving out for ideological and political struggle as we strive to develop collective understandings of who we are, what we’re up against, and how best to fight back?

During the 1966 Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, Amilcar Cabral made his famous Weapon of Theory speech. As some have noted, Cabral put forward a forceful argument that the struggle for national liberation against the devastation wrought by colonialism and imperialism was a struggle for history itself: an active historical understanding of their conditions allowed the oppressed not only to overturn the racist mythology proclaiming they had no history, but also to forcefully carve out an understanding of themselves as protagonists of a freedom struggle in the present, and as architects of a liberated future. Of course, this would not be easy. As Cabral (1966) put it:

The ideological deficiency, not to say the total lack of ideology, within the national liberation movements—which is basically due to ignorance of the historical reality which these movements claim to transform—constitutes one of the greatest weaknesses of our struggle against imperialism, if not the greatest weakness of all.

In reflecting on this moment, we think it is useful to re-engage with similar challenges and questions, albeit in markedly different conditions. How do we build and use weapons of theory? How do we create lasting environments in which people can put their creative energies to use, forging and testing conceptions of how to “produce and make history”? We can start by drawing lessons from how social movement–affiliated education projects responded to crises in other periods. The Highlander Folk School, for instance, started in the wake of the Scottsborough Boys arrests and militant labor upheaval and repression in the region. The Highlander Folk School, and later the Highlander Research and Education Center, was also a key resource for civil rights activists and organizations and played a pivotal role as a strategic incubator of the Montgomery Bus Boycott and in the founding of the Student Nonviolence Coordinating Committee (SNCC). During a period in which Black people faced intense repression, violence, and intimidation for attempting to register and vote, Septima Clark’s Citizenship Schools extended the work of Highlander outward from the physical space of the school and were an essential (and often clandestine) vehicle in helping people meet the literacy tests required to vote, while also teaching politics and organizing.

During the ensuing decades, civil rights and liberation struggles of oppressed people in the United States increasingly drew a common cause and shared fate with Third World liberation struggles across the globe. Countless progressive, radical, and revolutionary organizations wove intensive studies and analyses of political theory and practice into their organizing work—often drawing from the theoretical engagements, elaborations, and struggles of liberation organizations worldwide. Indeed, the struggle for education as liberation drove Third World students to carve out spaces for workers and people of color on campuses across the United States, leading to the founding of Ethnic Studies as a recognized academic discipline (a struggle which continues to this day). Amidst the lethal backlash against liberation movements in the 1960s and 1970s, the Brecht Forum in New York City emerged in part from collaborative work for Puerto Rican independence. The Brecht Forum became an important vehicle for Left learning, strategy, and struggle in the 1980s, and more recently as a place for thinking and strategizing during the 2008 financial crisis and the Occupy movement.

Several organizations, including the Highlander Center and our own Center for Political Education, have joined other powerful education resources across the US and the world in continuing to provide spaces for study, reflection, analysis, and strategy. These kinds of spaces are more crucial than ever to understand our movements, to analyze our conditions, and to prepare to fight back. Returning to Weapon of Theory, Cabral reminds us that “every practice produces a theory,” and that “nobody has yet made a successful revolution without a revolutionary theory.” More than six decades before Cabral’s speech at the 1966 Tricontinental Conference, V.I. Lenin (1902/1993), writing from within a movement facing intense state repression, offered a similar analysis in What Is to Be Done? He averred that theory was an indispensable guard against “the narrowest forms of practical activity.”

The rise of Trump and the onslaughts he has promised to unleash are matters of dire urgency. There is no doubt that social change organizations should be taking up practical activities to protect themselves and their communities while building resistance and shifting power. The urgency that surrounds and compels us may discourage us from pausing to think deeply and rigorously. However, our ability to fight for the long haul depends on this deep thinking. Creating, valuing, and nurturing durable and thoughtful spaces for developing praxis in direct response to our times, places, conditions, and abilities is critically important as we face the perils that surely lie ahead. Now more than ever, we must understand that theory and analysis are crucial weapons, rather than things we don’t have time for.

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References and Further Readings
Cabral, Amilcar. 1966. “The Weapon of Theory.” Speech delivered to the Tricontinental Conference of the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Havana, Cuba.
Lenin, V.I. 1902/1993. What Is to Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement. New York: International Publishers. 11th ed.

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* Rachel Herzing and Isaac Ontiveros are codirectors of The Center for Political Education, a resource for political organizations on the Left, progressive social movements, the working class, and people of color in the San Francisco Bay Area.

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Header image (left) by Joe Brusky, used under CC BY-SA 2.0 / Cropped and modified.

Trump’s Health Care Agenda

This post is part of a series on the possible impacts of Trump’s election on a variety of social justice issues. Click here to read more.

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by Thomas Bodenheimer*

The nomination of Tom Price to be Secretary of Health and Human Services and of Seema Verma to run the Medicare and Medicaid programs ensures a major attack on health services for the people of the United States. On health care, there is agreement between the Steve Bannon/Tea Party faction of the Trump pre-administration and the Paul Ryan/traditional Republican faction: they both want to repeal the Affordable Care Act (ACA). This agreement will affect both the individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion portions of the ACA. On the other major healthcare issue, the future of Medicare, the Trump factions disagree. The Paul Ryan faction and Tom Price hope to convert Medicaid into a privatized voucher system, whereas Trump’s pre-election statements—supported by much of his base—suggest that Trump wants to leave Medicare alone.

This review of Trump’s health care agenda looks at the ACA’s individual mandate, the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, and the future of Medicare.

The Individual Mandate

Inspired by the work of the Heritage Foundation in the 1980s, the ACA required people without health insurance to purchase insurance from a federal or state insurance exchange or to pay a fine. This is called an individual mandate because it mandates people to buy individual insurance if they lack employer-based private insurance, Medicare, or Medicaid. However, the Heritage Foundation has reversed itself and is now a leader in the movement to repeal Obamacare.

By 2016, the ACA had insured about 20 million previously uninsured people, about 10 million through the individual mandate and 10 million through Medicaid expansion. People buying insurance through the federal or state exchanges could purchase a bronze, silver, gold, or platinum policy, with the bronze plan having the lowest premiums but highest deductibles and the platinum plan having the highest premiums and lowest deductibles. About three-quarters purchased the silver plan, which pays for 70 percent of average healthcare costs leaving 30 percent for the patient/family to pay out of pocket. In 2016, premiums for the silver plan varied widely by patient’s age and health status and by location; for example, the silver plan monthly premiums for a 40-year-old nonsmoker were $186 in Albuquerque and $719 in Anchorage, Alaska. However, 85 percent of people insured through an exchange received a federal subsidy that reduced their premium by an average of 73 percent. Even with the subsidy allowing families to purchase a silver plan, the average silver plan deductible in 2016 was $3,000 per person.

Tom Price, HHS secretary-designate, has been a leader in the multiyear Republican effort to repeal Obamacare. He has introduced a replacement that eliminates the individual mandate and proposes tax credits (far smaller than the ACA’s subsidies) to help people purchase individual insurance policies. Analyses of these voluntary tax-credits have estimated that only a few people would choose to buy insurance under such a program, thereby leaving most of the 10 million individual enrollees in Obamacare without coverage. Trump’s campaign promise that he would not allow insurers to exclude people with pre-existing conditions is an empty promise, because the insurers could raise their premiums for people with such conditions to unaffordable levels.

The strength of a popular backlash against the Obamacare repeal is difficult to judge. In a post-election poll, 52 percent of Republicans wanted Obamacare repealed, down from 69 percent in October. Trump, Tom Price, and Paul Ryan may have their hands full.


The expansion of Medicaid, the program for low-income individuals and families, has been the most successful portion of the ACA, adding 10 million Medicaid beneficiaries in 31 states plus the District of Columbia. (Most Republican governors refused to expand Medicaid in their states.) Medicaid is now the country’s largest health insurance program, covering 73 million people. In Medicaid expansion states, everyone (except the undocumented) with incomes below 138 percent of the federal poverty line ($33,500 for a family of four) is eligible for Medicaid. In most expansion states, Medicaid beneficiaries have no premiums or deductibles and no or minimal copayments. Most states enroll Medicaid beneficiaries in managed care plans that have been quite successful in reducing the growth of Medicaid costs.

For years, Paul Ryan and the House Republicans have pushed to transform the entire Medicaid program into block grants. Currently, each state government pays managed care plans a certain amount per Medicaid beneficiary or it pays hospitals, doctors, and pharmacies when Medicaid beneficiaries receive care; then the federal government pays the states a certain percentage of those costs—50 percent for higher-income states like California, 90 percent for poorer states like Mississippi. For states that have expanded Medicaid under the ACA, the federal government has paid almost all of the costs. How would block grants change this payment model?

Under block grant legislation, the federal government would send each state a lump sum each year, which would be considerably less than what states currently receive from the federal government. States could then decide how to address the severe funding reductions. Some states could cut Medicaid beneficiaries from the program; others could reduce the services provided under Medicaid (such as eliminating dental care); others could pay hospitals and doctors and nursing homes less, which would cause those providers to stop caring for Medicaid beneficiaries.

The preferred model for state policy under a block grant program is currently underway in Vice President-elect Mike Pence’s Indiana, and it was devised by Seema Verma, who Trump has nominated to run Medicare and Medicaid. Indiana’s Medicaid program requires enrollees to pay a monthly premium of $1 to $27 depending on income. Enrollees below the poverty line who choose not to pay the premium are charged copays for physician visits and prescriptions. If the premium is not paid, beneficiaries above the poverty line lose Medicaid coverage for six months, whereas those below the poverty line must make copayments for services. About one-third of individuals who apply for Medicaid and are found eligible are not enrolled because they do not make a premium payment.

A large body of research shows that premiums and cost-sharing are barriers to care for individuals with low incomes and significant health care needs. State savings from cost-sharing and premiums accrue more because of declines in coverage and utilization than due to increases in revenues. In its 2003 redesign, Oregon Medicaid created a “standard plan” with premiums of $6 to $20 per month; people who missed a premium payment lost their Medicaid for six months. In addition, copays were instituted. Due to these patient cost-sharing requirements, 77 percent of Medicaid standard plan beneficiaries dropped their coverage. Many reported increased medical debt and financial strain related to healthcare costs. Fewer people went to the doctor. Many who lost coverage remained uninsured and experienced major unmet healthcare needs. Florida, Kentucky, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin saw similar declines in enrollment when they raised the premiums in children’s health programs. Other states have abandoned enrollee cost-sharing (premiums and/or copayments) because it was too expensive to administer.

The combination of block grants and patient cost-sharing requirements will make Medicaid —the program for the most vulnerable populations—the most damaged health care program in the country.


For years, Republicans have tried to privatize Medicare. Rather than automatically receiving a Medicare card upon turning 65, elderly people would be given a voucher to be used in buying a private insurance plan. However, the voucher would be worth far less than the cost of the insurance plan, forcing Medicare beneficiaries to pay far more for their coverage and their care. Medicare administrative costs, now about 3 percent, would jump to 15 or 20 percent.

Medicare is not exactly cheap for seniors now; it currently pays for only 58 percent of the average beneficiary’s health care costs, requiring the majority of beneficiaries to buy private plans to fill in the gaps. But under the Obama administration, some of these private plans—the Medicare Advantage plans—have actually offered good deals for seniors while saving money for the government. Trump’s campaign promise to reduce Medicare drug prices has already been placed on the back burner, likely never to surface again.

Prior to the election, Trump promised to leave Medicare alone. But his HHS Secretary pick, Tom Price, agrees with Paul Ryan that Medicare should be privatized. Pressure from the grassroots will determine what happens, but Medicare is not safe.


About half the population is covered by employer-sponsored health insurance and will be less affected by Trump’s health policy; but the other half—those on Medicare, Medicaid, and individual private insurance—will find their health care coverage on the chopping block unless the public resists with a massive voice. Most vulnerable is Medicaid, which, as a program for low-income people with less political clout, could be destroyed beyond recognition.

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*Thomas Bodenheimer is a medical doctor who has practiced in San Francisco. He is the co-author with Kevin Grumbach of Understanding Health Policy: A Clinical Approach (2012).

Header image (left): “Healthcare Is a Human Right” by Juhan Sonin, used under CC BY-SA 2.0 / Cropped and modified.

Gender and Trump

This post is part of a series on the possible impacts of Trump’s election on a variety of social justice issues. Click here to read more.

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by Carol C. Mukhopadhyay*

The 2016 election truly set a precedent for gender politics. The Democratic Party became the first major US political party to select a woman, Hillary Clinton, as its presidential candidate.  As is now well-known, she won the popular vote by nearly 3 million votes but lost in the Electoral College. Among the multiple factors responsible for her defeat, gender played a major—though under-analyzed—role. The failure of (mainly male) political consultants and pollsters to recognize how gender issues and misogyny permeated this campaign may be one reason they miscalculated Trump’s appeal and the election results. Yet post-election discussions, often by these same pundits, continue to downplay gender, or simply draw upon long-standing cultural and religious models that blame women for personal and societal failures. So we blame Hillary for being such a “weak” candidate (by what standards?), or “white” (Euro-American) women for “abandoning” Hillary Clinton, despite evidence to the contrary relative to previous elections.

Therefore, as we assess the likely impacts of a Trump/Republican presidency, we must not ignore gender, especially since the progressive Left has often prioritized other “isms” and injustices over gender justice. In what follows, I will sketch some of the ways this election has affected and will continue to affect gender issues in the United States.

Women on the US Political Leadership Stage

In 2016, for the first time, two women participated in televised presidential primary debates. Millions, including children, saw articulate and accomplished women competing with men for the title of Commander-in-Chief. In three presidential debates, millions watched Hillary Clinton successfully handle the prototypic Alpha male, Donald Trump, as he alternatively bragged, growled, interrupted, smirked, insulted, even stalked, and in other ways tried to dominate and intimidate his presidential opponent. Untold numbers of women decided they, too, were “nasty women,” and proud of it! The positive role-modeling impacts were incalculable… But how long will they last, now?

The Gendered White House Family

The 2016 presidential campaign challenged, at least momentarily, the traditional gendered institution of the White House’s First Family. If the president’s spouse were to be male, what would happen to the First Lady role? Who would be “help mate” and “listener,” handle “domestic affairs,” and organize important social occasions? Had Hillary Clinton become president, gender would have come to the forefront as the “First Gentleman” role evolved. Certainly no one expected Bill Clinton to choose China patterns, redecorate, or become a fashion setter.  

The First Family and First Lady who will inhabit Trump’s White House symbolize a retrograde, pre-feminist vision of gender and family. News reports already show Donald Trump surrounded by and conversing with men… except for the strikingly dressed, heavily made-up, spike heels–wearing, visually present but silent and voiceless future First Lady. What role model does Melania Trump represent for US girls? And for girls (and boys) globally? It is a model of womanhood where looks are more important than having something to say, and physical appearance rather than educational or professional accomplishments is the route to success, wealth, and power.

Consensual Sexual Interactions

The Presidential campaign stimulated a discussion of often-ignored gender-related topics.  Despite some progress, sexual harassment and sexual assault, including rape, remain widespread at work and colleges (see the Stanford case), as well as the pressure on women—and institutions—to remain silent. The backlash against women willing to share their Trump stories during the campaign illustrates why women are reluctant to come forth; but it also inspired thousands of other women to go public with their own experiences.

The ability of the Trump campaign to deflect—and of voters to ignore—Trump’s brazen bragging about sexual assault, the multiple well-researched cases of Trump’s unwanted sexual aggressions, and his denials and threats of retaliation against accusers do not bode well for the future. Voter reactions indicate that “locker room talk” and unwanted sexual “advances” are still considered normal and acceptable by some, perhaps many. After all, “boys will be boys”… just like our president!

Double Standards and Patriarchal Stereotypes

The 2016 presidential campaign reflected a double standard for women vs. male candidates. Hillary Clinton’s competence and stamina were subjected to scrutiny and criticism not applied to male candidates. Additional gender-specific criteria were imposed: likeability, smiling, warmth, and appearance—she did not look” “presidential.” But had she been 6’1” ft. tall, with large biceps, and “tough,” she would most likely have been disqualified from the start!

Acceptable male traits—being ambitious, goal-focused, strategic, and wanting the Presidency—became part of a “power-hungry” critique of Hillary Clinton, and many voters perceived her as less trustworthy and truthful than Donald Trump. At Republicans rallies, shouts of “lock her up” bore a frightening resemblance to mob violence against African Americans, or Jews, gays, and socialists in Nazi Germany; or to the violence that fueled Medieval European witch-burnings of women.

Reproductive Rights

One of the most troubling consequences of Trump’s election concerns reproductive rights. For women who grew up without access to birth control or legal abortion, and for feminists who have studied gender systems, reproductive rights are essential for achieving gender equality. Under a Trump/Republican administration, we can expect assaults on and attempts to criminalize abortion, and increases in forced pregnancy and forced motherhood.

Any Supreme Court justice nominee must pass an anti-abortion, anti–Roe v. Wade litmus test with profound consequences for court decisions. States will increasingly pass restrictive laws requiring abortion clinics to have hospital-level facilities, or defining a fertilized cell (sperm-egg fusion) as a person, with any pregnancy termination constituting “murder.” Even if abortion remains legal, we can expect other burdensome regulations, such as parental or spousal consent, invasive vaginal probes, long waiting periods, or requirements that physicians provide biased, often false abortion “information.”

The virulent anti-abortion rhetoric of the Republican primaries and Trump’s electoral win will embolden anti-abortion activists to intensify protests and intimidation tactics. Some Planned Parenthood clinics have reported more verbally aggressive protestors, harassing clients with shouts of “Don’t kill your baby.” We may see challenges to laws restricting protestors (e.g., blocking clinic access), as well as clinic bombings and murders of physicians and other abortion providers. Fewer medical schools will teach abortion procedures, and even fewer physicians will take the risks (physical and financial) of providing abortions. Today, with Roe v. Wade intact, less than 15% of all US counties have a legal abortion provider. That percentage will decline.

The war on Planned Parenthood will intensify. Planned Parenthood, under current law, cannot use public funds for abortions. Defunding Planned Parenthood essentially means making it ineligible to receive Medicaid reimbursement for other health-related services like cancer screenings, pregnancy, family planning, or genital infections. This affects poor women the most, and millions could lose access to basic health care and contraception. Planned Parenthood will survive; but its resources, ability to serve current clinics and populations, will decline. And all reproductive rights organizations will have to expend resources to challenge restrictive laws or defend against new attacks (e.g., accusations of fetal tissue “sales”).

Under the lead of conservative religious Republicans, comprehensive sex education programs may be replaced by abstinence-only programs that only advocate sex within heterosexual marriage (despite their documented failure). Even if contraception coverage should survive new attacks of the American Family Foundation, more private businesses, like Hobby Lobby, will probably refuse to cover employees on grounds of their personal religious beliefs.

Recent declines in unplanned teen pregnancies will likely be reversed as comprehensive sex education is defunded. Female fertility rates will increase, most among younger, poorer, less educated women from conservative religions. If history repeats itself, we can expect negative impacts on girls schooling and on education-dependent jobs and careers. Women and families will struggle to feed, care for, and educate additional unplanned children; and local and state governments will strain to provide education and other services for a growing population. Less contraception access leads to more pregnancies… and to more abortions, legal or not. Currently, an estimated 22 million women experience unsafe abortion worldwide, causing approximately 47,000 deaths each year. Those numbers will go up.


Trump’s election in many ways represented the reemergence, indeed the triumph, of hyper-masculine, hyper-sexualized, hyper-aggressive, tough-guise masculinity… and a successful assault on the models of gender and gender relationships represented by Hillary Clinton and many of her supporters. Some younger professional women were apparently shocked at the level of sexism and misogyny revealed by this election. They had naively assumed that they were living in a post-feminist, post-sexist, post-misogyny world.

Perhaps one positive impact of Trump’s victory will be to awaken these young women (and men), to stir them to action and into taking ownership of the next wave of feminism. The fear is that it might take several years to recover from the damages of a Trump/Pence/Republican administration.

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Additional Resources and Links
Center for American Women and Politics
Pew Research Institute (US and International Data)
Presidential Gender Watch

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*Dr. Carol C. Mukhopadhyay (website) is Professor Emerita in the Department of Anthropology at San Jose State University. She specializes in gender, family, sexuality, race/ethnicity, methodology, and comparative education, and has conducted field research on gendered activities in domestic, political, and public life in India and the United States. Recent publications include How Real is Race? A Sourcebook on Race, Culture and Biology (with R. Henze and Y. Moses, 2014) and several articles and chapters in edited books.

Header image (left): “Keep Abortion Safe, Legal & Accessible” by Debra Sweet, used under CC BY-SA 2.0 / Cropped and modified.

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Latin America vs. Trump

This post is part of a series on the possible impacts of Trump’s election on a variety of social justice issues. Click here to read more.

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by Clifford Welch*

The new year had barely begun when the sting of a yet-to-be-installed president Trump rocked Latin America with Tweets supporting the Ford Motor Company’s decision to abandon construction of a car plant in Mexico. This one event, coupled with Trump’s reported attempts to cause Toyota and General Motors (GM) to downscale their operations in the region, seemed to confirm the troubled future a variety of Latin American pundits have projected for US–Latin American relations once Trump is inaugurated.

During the campaign, Latin America was rarely mentioned. Since voters elected Trump, however, discussion around the region has hovered like a drone over uncertain targets: What will the future bring? How will access to the United States change—for tourists, immigrants, investors, and products? What will the new hemispheric security arrangement be? How can the region benefit from Trump’s presidency? These questions and more have been debated in the media and the academy since Trump became the GOP presidential candidate.

Most readers know that US–Latin American relations have often been tense. The United States generally supported movements to end Spanish colonialism in the 19th century but gradually sought hegemony over the region with new forms of commercial and ideological domination in the 20th century. A few periods were marked by closer relationships. One of these occurred during the Great Depression and World War II, when the United States needed resources and security assistance from Latin America; another came after the Cuban Revolution culminated in 1959, when the United States allied with diverse authoritarian governments to operate counter-insurgency programs in the region. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, counter-insurgency operations morphed into counter-narcotics and counter-terrorist initiatives, and trade agreements grew in importance. To some extent, relations improved with the ongoing Middle East crisis in the 21st century, because it caused the United States to pay less attention to the region, allowing increased autonomy so long as the region presented neither security nor commercial threats. As a result, the region lessened its dependency on the United States by increasing its relations with other countries, especially China.

Trump’s election called into question these more recent security and commercial arrangements. As the former Mexican diplomat Jorge Castañeda wrote about the advent of Trump, “one thing seems certain, the international order that emerged after the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1989 will change.” In the context of Ford’s announcement, Mexico’s La Jornada reported that Trump threatened Toyota, too, for its plans to build a factory in Mexico. Trump similarly threatened GM with an import tax on any Mexican-made vehicle it attempted to sell in the United States The threats and pull-out, which was said to be motivated by reasons other than Trump’s tweets, angered Mexicans and sent shock waves as far away as Argentina, where the Clarin news organization associated the threats with Trump’s “protectionist, antiglobalization policies” aimed at generating industrial jobs in the “depressed Mid-West.”

The irony is that NAFTA, the free trade treaty constructed between Mexico, the United States, and Canada nearly a quarter-century ago, has benefited the United States much more than Mexico. Millions of peasant farmers lost their land and livelihoods when NAFTA allowed US farmers to export their corn to Mexico and transnational agribusinesses to grow produce for export to the United States without fear of tariffs. In fact, the US agricultural trade with Mexico tripled under NAFTA, and the destruction of suddenly unprotected traditional agriculture sent millions in search of jobs. The economy failed to absorb the flood of new jobseekers, whose presence also depressed wages. Thus, Mexico’s poverty rate has not improved since NAFTA’s launch. As a consequence, one of NAFTA’s main goals—discouraging illegal immigration from Mexico to the United States—failed to materialize. In fact, Central American and Caribbean countries that have also signed free trade agreements with the United States join Mexico as major sources of undocumented immigrants to the United States. Trump’s interventions, which already eliminated hundreds of Ford construction jobs and a planned 2,800 factory jobs, only worsen prospects for improvement.

The lesson of the Ford case for La Jornada is recognition that the end of the development model based on free trade agreements is close at hand and that Mexico must “urgently reconfigure” its economy around “el mercado interno y … la diversificación commercial.” The intellectual and campesíndio activist Armando Bartra had made these points a month earlier in the same newspaper, anticipating that Trump’s neoprotectionist and migrant-expulsion plans would make 2017 a “catastrophic” year. He saw in Bernie Sanders’s phenomenal electoral appeal hope for a leftist victory in Mexico and called on voters to support candidates who represent indigenous Mexico and “un programa consensuado de salvación nacional.”

The inward turn represented by Trump and somewhat by Bartra and La Jornada’s editorial writers is present in other responses to Trump’s election. In sum, both Trump’s pro-US discourse and his actions have stimulated nationalism in Latin America. They have restored relevance to the nation-state in the context of globalization’s celebration of internationalism. Humberto Vacaflor, writing in the venerable El Diário, emphasized similarities between Bolivian president Evo Morales and Trump, noting that Morales shares the American magnate’s suspicion of trade agreements, since they “take advantage” of countries like Bolivia. Trump says he wants foreign states to pay more for the presence of US armed forces, but Morales does not want US military support. In the war on drugs, Trump’s nationalism may help Bolivia avoid pressure to cooperate with the US military, since Bolivia’s cocaine is sold in Brazil, Argentina, and Europe, not the United States. In a tweet congratulating Trump, Morales defiantly expressed his hopes to work jointly against racism, machismo, and xenophobia.

In the case of Cuba, the story is somewhat inverted, as the country has struggled bravely against US-imposed isolation ever since the Soviet Union collapsed. President Obama helped change the situation by negotiating to normalize relations with Cuban president Raul Castro. However, nearly all of his initiatives took the form of executive orders that Trump has threatened to revoke, demanding sweeping changes in Cuba in exchange for normalization. Trump’s plans to restore the old order provoked Cuba to react traditionally to the United States’ threats: a few days after the US election, Castro ordered four days of strategic military exercises.

Venezuela is another country searching for a silver lining in Trump’s triumph. Undermined by low oil prices, president Nicolás Maduro’s government also faces fierce political opposition. Part of his strategy for maintaining power has included representing the United States as a threat. By insulting the United States, Maduro may stoke Trump’s wrath, Vacaflor suggests. With the stroke of a pen, he could cut off oil exports to Venezuela, provoking further economic havoc. This would hand Maduro’s enemies one more weapon. For them, Trump’s victory is an example of the dramatic electoral change they have longed for since Hugo Chavez was elected president in 1999, initiating close to 15 years of radical change in the country. For his part, Maduro congratulated Trump on his election and expressed his admiration of the president-elect’s defense of national sovereignty and self-determination.

In covering Ford’s reneging on the car plant in Mexico, the Argentine press followed some distinct lines of argument that held out hope for US investments. They gave special attention to reports claiming that the company’s decision was related not to Trump’s tweets but to changes in forecasts for the auto industry, especially to increased interest in self-driving vehicles. According to this perspective, Ford abandoned expansion plans in Mexico because they envisioned slow sales for the cars they planned to build in the plant and little chance of reorienting production toward self-driving cars because such a high-tech operation “necesita personal que tenga conocimientos de informática, más graduados de la universidade que de la escuela secundaria, mano de obra altamente calificada, más fácil de conseguir en Estados Unidos que en México”—as the Argentinian Infobae news outlet polemized. Since Argentines infamously see themselves as more European than Latin American, the subtext of this story is that such a pull-out would not have occurred in Argentina.

With the recent election of neoliberal Mauricio Macri as president, Argentina quickly became the new model for Latin America’s future. Last March, Obama visited the country to “affirm Argentina’s shift to the center.” Whereas Trump cancelled planned talks on construction projects in Argentina as part of his response to concerns about conflict of interest, his son Eric visited the region early in 2017 and commented on how Argentina had changed under Macri to become “un mercado mucho más receptivo para las inversiones.” In fact, Donald and Mauricio have known each other for more than 30 years. Macri’s father was a real estate developer in New York who fell afoul of the mafia that controlled construction and trucking. Trump played the senior Macri like a puppet, selling him five mansions for a high price and buying them back from him for a low price once Macri gave up on the project. Macri just didn’t have the connections Trump enjoyed.

If Trump really does break the free trade treaties that govern many multinational and binational relations between the United States and Latin America, the region’s leaders will have to be careful not to be taken advantage of like Macri’s father. The first to pay for such errors are the poor and the needy and the state institutions designed to further social justice. Although Morales will soon be replaced as president, voters in Bolivia and other Latin American countries may find in Trump stimulus to support politicians who, as Bartra indicated, will place questions of social justice ahead of economic growth schemes that seem to backfire.

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*Clifford Welch is a former San Francisco longshoreman, ranchhand, reporter, and cofounder of the National Writers Union. He teaches contemporary Brazilian history at the Federal University of São Paulo (UNIFESP).

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Some Aspects of the Trump Administration’s Foreign Policy

This post is part of a series on the possible impacts of Trump’s election on a variety of social justice issues. Click here to read more.

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by Gregory Shank*

In 2016, Donald Trump’s right-wing populism splintered the coalition constituting the Republican Party and coopted issues that set apart the most vibrant wing of the Democratic Party, the supporters of Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren. That platform suggested movement toward a noninterventionist approach in foreign policy, opposition to globalization strategies and multilateral agreements favoring liberal internationalists within the corporate elite, and, implicitly, a condemnation of the harmful effects of post-2007 austerity (caused by the excesses of financialization) on the increasingly marginalized middle and working classes of the United States (and Europe, perhaps with the exception of Germany).

The core of Trump’s foreign policy is outlined in his campaign speeches before the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPEC) Conference in March 2016, before the Center for the National Interest in April, and in his September national security address in Philadelphia. Further evidence comes from the post-election appointments to key positions in the national security apparatus and the cabinet portfolios responsible for foreign policy. Finally, although the chief executive may enjoy the greatest freedom of action in the foreign policy arena, all options are severely constrained by the wars and crises handed off by the previous administration, a reality President Obama also confronted.


Trump’s address before 18,000 people at the AIPAC Policy Conference in Washington, DC, sought to bring his candidacy into the mainstream and to lay out policies that might smooth over relations with the Jewish community. Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kurshner (a Trump senior advisor on domestic and foreign policy), Haaretz newspaper reported, wrote the speech. He consulted with Israel’s ambassador to the United States, Ron Dermer (a longtime Trump admirer, who defended Trump strategist Steve Bannon against charges of anti-Semitism), on matters relating to Israeli diplomatic and security policy. Kurshner, a real estate investor, AIPAC donor, and Orthodox Jew with connections to Israel’s Likud party, also enlisted the help of Ken Kurson, the editor of the New York Observer (a Kurshner property). Kurson offered expertise and experience as a speechwriter and close collaborator in advancing Rudolph Giuliani’s presidential aspirations.

The content of the speech is derived from materials provided by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It highlights vintage global war on terror threats concerning “rogue states” and terror networks emanating from Iran (and its “puppet states”) intent on destabilizing and dominating the region, while dismissing Palestinian claims to sovereignty and freedom from occupation because their schools and mosques produce a “culture of hatred” and indiscriminate death, again thanks to Iranian funding. Trump reiterates that Israel will remain a strategic ally; his intention to move the American embassy to Jerusalem, “the eternal capital of the Jewish people” (a hot-button issue fortified by David Friedman, Trump’s designated ambassador to Israel); his opposition to United Nations (UN) resolutions that condition an eventual agreement between Israel and Palestine; and his ambivalent plan to either dismantle the Iran nuclear accord or simply “enforce the terms of the previous deal to hold Iran totally accountable.”


Given the primacy of Israel, plus the March 2016 naming of militarist foreign policy advisors and the incorporation of Iraq War hawks James Woolsey and John Bolton as Trump national security and foreign affairs advisors in August and September, early critics understandably concluded that the incoming administration’s international initiatives would differ little from the dominant neoconservative practices of the Bush and Obama presidencies. Worse yet, human rights would probably be downplayed internationally, including unabashed Ronald Reagan-style support for foreign dictators. Yet that view overlooks a novel element in the Trump victory: the probable ouster of the entire foreign policy establishment serving George H.W. Bush onward and the demotion of covert regime change initiatives organized primarily by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the Middle East. If personnel choices translate into policy, this could portend a significant shift. It would account for much of the Never Trump movement among Republicans and some of the bipartisan post-election fury surrounding Russia, which aims to undermine Trump’s amorphous but stubborn moves toward détente.

The repudiation of neoconservative interventionists in the Democratic and Republican parties had multiple sources during the 2016 campaign. Rand Paul libertarians, along with personnel from the Charles Koch Institute and the Koch-funded Cato Institute, launched a think tank called the Defense Priorities Foundation and an advocacy arm, the Defense Priorities Initiative, to lobby for a less militaristic foreign policy (the Kochs did not finance these new entities). The Trump campaign outflanked this initiative on the right, with differences centering on the purported security threat posed by immigration and unconditional support for Israel. Each campaign and set of institutions called for an end to perpetual war, arguing that the lethal military power pursued over the past fifteen years in the Middle East, including the expanded use of drones, had failed to protect the United States. Each buttressed the case with respected military officers, veterans of the string of limited wars and counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

In a March interview with the Washington Post, Trump signaled his intention to take a noninterventionist approach in world affairs or at least to lighten the US footprint worldwide. Despite unrest abroad, especially in the Middle East, Trump said the United States must look inward and steer its resources toward rebuilding domestic infrastructure. These themes were flushed out in two critical speeches, one on “America First” at the Mayflower Hotel and the other on “Peace Through Strength” at the Union League of Philadelphia. The central message is that Trump’s foreign policy will be tempered by realism and will dispense with the long-dominant foreign policy wing of the Republican Party. After the struggle against German and Japanese imperialism and the succeeding Cold War, Trump told his audiences, the United States has been on a downward arc for lack of a new vision. An arrogant democratizing and nation-building mission in the Middle East and elsewhere has produced chaos and genocide, while overextending national resources. With war-fighting generals at his side, he will avoid endless wars and no longer topple regimes, a policy that has created power vacuums and immigration insecurity across Europe and the United States. Supposedly temporary post-World Way II security structures such as NATO and the nuclear umbrella have become an outdated, unaffordable luxury, and countries that have enjoyed American largess (especially Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia) must assume more of the burden to defend themselves.

US military strength, Trump says, must be bolstered by expanding the capacities of all branches of the service and updating the arsenal of nuclear weapons, to match Russian and Chinese efforts. US economic strength must be leveraged to gain more cooperation from China in terms of North Korea and the South China Sea; and the American technological lead must grow in terms of artificial intelligence and cyber warfare. These tools, plus financial and ideological warfare, will be used against terrorist threats. Resort to military force may be necessary, but the emphasis is on restoring stability, peace, and prosperity, not war and destruction. Russia and China share interests with the United States and need not be adversaries (unlike Iran). The nation-state is paramount, and globalism in the form of international unions is unnecessarily constricting. For instance, the NAFTA agreement has hollowed out the nation’s manufacturing capacity and eliminated jobs. Reversing these agreements, and investing in military modernization and cybersecurity, will provide jobs for young Americans—including in the inner cities.

This hybrid set of goals derives from several conflicting political currents. The more visionary dimension is reflected in the host of the April 27 speech: the Center for the National Interest (CNI). Jared Kushner facilitated the choice of CNI, which publishes the National Interest. Its editor, Jacob Heilbrunn, promotes the “realist” school of foreign policy, which advocates balance-of-power geopolitics, careful circumspection about intervention abroad, and the need for the United States to husband its resources. Layne’s “Graceful Decline,” published in The American Conservative (owned by Silicon Valley software developer Ron Unz) systematically sets out in polished form the key concepts that Trump refers to elliptically in his speeches. After describing why the United States has declined internationally, Layne argues that the current era of globalization is ending, with Pax Americana to be replaced by an international order that reflects the interests, values, and norms of emerging powers, such as China, India, and Russia. In this multipolar world, the United States must coexist with rising powers, especially China.

The new US global posture would involve strategic retrenchment, burden shifting (which rolls back current security commitments to NATO, Japan, and South Korea, while providing advanced weapons and military technology to friendly states in Europe and Asia), and abandonment of the global counterinsurgency campaign in the Middle East. The default US foreign policy of intervention must end, meaning the sidelining of the counterinsurgency lobby in both major political parties, including their respective private think tanks. In short, the emerging strategy reduces the importance of nonstate terrorists or minor powers, because great powers can only be defeated by other great powers.

The European Right

Another policy current consists of Trump advisors who identify with European right-wing movements. Some coalesced around the anti-immigrant focus of Jeff Sessions’ congressional office, others drew support from Mercer-funded entities that are now involved in the upcoming French and German elections (using Breitbart, just as Cambridge Analytica was in the pro-Brexit Leave.EU effort, to Trump’s delight), along with denizens of the national security apparatus (such as national security adviser Michael T. Flynn), with concerns over the spread of “radical Islam.” Steve Bannon views in Trump the possibility of restoring true American capitalism, assisted by the right-wing populist uprisings in Europe to “undo the global power structure—the banks, the government, the media, the guardians of secular culture.” Symptomatic of this insistence on the menace of immigration, notably absent from Trump’s speeches was any notion that the continent of Africa (except Libya) exists or that below Mexico the hemisphere includes Central and Latin American nations. Most realists take offense at this, as do Silicon Valley companies that rely on an international pool of skilled coders, engineers, and entrepreneurs.

Trump’s unique turn of phrase, the “folly of globalism,” may originate in the writings of Garet Garrett, an Old Right luminary and part of the generation behind the 1940s isolationist America First mass movement (see Raimondo 2008). The phrase also figures prominently in the lexicon of the European far Right, such as in Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National, where globalism (mondialisme, not globalization) refers to the homogenizing influence of world markets on peoples and cultures, promoted by open borders, massive immigration, and the transference of sovereignty to a supranational European Union (see Zúquete 2015). In Trump’s “Declaring American Economic Independence” speech, his stances on trade and supranational agreements such as NAFTA align him with that position, but also with critics like Joseph E. Stiglitz (2016), who argues that “Americans are economically worse off than they were a quarter-century ago” and that trade and financial liberalization have not delivered the general prosperity promised.

Although Layne’s realism calls for deep reductions in defense expenditures, Trump’s “Peace through Strength” speech is reminiscent of Ronald Reagan’s duplicitous missile-gap message. The term often signifies peace through war and an overreliance on force over political and diplomatic solutions, but Trump has stated that resort to force is a sign of weakness. Why, then, field an army of 540,000 troops (the size of George W. Bush’s full-scale invasion forces in Iraq and Afghanistan)? Military Keynesianism would appeal to defense contractors and a planned reversal of sequestration of military spending for all the services would help to defuse opposition by the civilian neoliberal counterinsurgency lobby. Yet, increasing the defense budget by 55 to 80 billion dollars per year cannot be offset by better controls on fraud or by policing procurement inefficiencies. This will necessitate cuts in the domestic safety net. As an employment strategy, military spending creates far fewer jobs than the same dollars do when invested in education, clean energy, or health care.

Anti-Sanctions Internationalists

Secretary of State-designate Rex Tillerson personifies another foreign policy current within the Trump administration. Attention has focused primarily on ExxonMobil’s pent-up Russian holdings, but the interests (wealth and power) of the US-based anti-sanctions corporate wing are constrained more broadly by international regulatory structures in the form of coercive sanctions on Russia, Iran, and elsewhere. In practice, the profit-rich and internally stable Iranian market became available to European firms after sanctions were lifted by the Iranian nuclear accord, and the Russian market will gradually become available to the Europeans as sanctions over the Ukraine and Crimea expire. German firms, in particular, would willingly partner in a Russian initiative to strengthen multipolarity and to push for a continent-wide European-Russian common industrial and energy zone. Trump suggested lifting US sanctions on Russia as part of a nuclear weapons reduction deal and centered criticism on the European Union as an instrument of German domination. A US-Russian tactical alliance could accelerate the stabilization of the Middle East. It would enhance control over world energy markets (with Saudi Arabia, the two nations rank among the world’s top three oil producers). Trump has threatened to end all US oil purchases from Saudi Arabia, likely to curtail its financial support of Salafist jihadist forces. A growing Israeli-Russian alliance draws on Israeli strengths in policing the pacification stage in Middle East conflicts. Russia’s negotiated Syrian settlement included Iran, Turkey, and later the Trump administration. This configuration creates uncertainties for Palestinian and Kurdish hopes for national sovereignty, while asserting and constraining Iranian regional aspirations.

Preliminary Conclusions

Unlike initiatives in the domestic policy arena, some of Trump’s foreign policy proposals, such as a reduced role in the Middle East, détente, and a scaling down of the post-World War II global security architecture, may not be unreasonable. However, there is no guarantee that the Trump coalition will accomplish this realignment. In the past, a civil war over foreign policy was waged in the shadows, and then openly, by opponents of Richard Nixon’s policies of détente with the USSR, rapprochement with China, and a negotiated end to the Vietnam War. That group coalesced as the neoconservatives, who sabotaged Nixon’s foreign policy agenda and his presidency (Colodny & Shachtman 2010). Today, those neoconservatives are joined in their counterattacks by Clinton Democrats such as Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer. Democrats engaged in post-election autopsy sessions should look hard at the yawning gap between the hawkish candidate they offered and the consistent popular sentiment against US military involvement abroad.

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Barrett, W. 2016. Trump: The Greatest Show on Earth: The Deals, the Downfall, the Reinvention. New York: Regan Arts.
Colodny, L., and T. Shachtman. 2010. The Forty Years War. New York: Harper Perennial.
Raimondo, J. 2008. Reclaiming the American Right: The Lost Legacy of the Conservative Movement. Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute.
Stiglitz, J.E. 2016. “How Trump Happened.” Project Syndicate, October 14.
Zúquete, J.P. 2015. “‘Free the People’: The Search for ‘True Democracy’ in Western Europe’s Far-Right Political Culture.” In The Promise and Perils of Populism: Global Perspectives, edited by Carlos de la Torre, pp. 231–64. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.

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Gregory Shank is the Co-managing Editor of Social Justice and lives in San Francisco.

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Death by a Thousand Budget Cuts: The Need for a New Fight for Poor People’s Rights

This post is part of a series on the possible impacts of Trump’s election on a variety of social justice issues. Click here to read more.

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by Tina Sacks*

You’re living in your poverty, your schools are no good, you have no jobs, 58 percent of your youth is unemployed—what the hell do you have to lose?
—Donald J. Trump on the presidential campaign trail, August 2016

As of January 2017 it appears that, we, indeed, have everything to lose. Donald J. Trump’s rhetorical exhortation to urban—i.e., Black—voters during the 2016 presidential campaign seems all too real now that he has ascended to the US presidency. Much has been made of the looming threats Trump poses to the safety net, including the Affordable Care Act, Obama’s flawed but remarkable piece of legislation that has expanded health insurance to 22 million Americans, protected people with preexisting conditions, and allowed young adults to remain on their parents’ insurance until age 26. Although the dismantling of the ACA is a horrifying prospect, particularly for people who have benefited from the Medicaid expansion, Trump’s deadliest actions may be felt by our fellow Americans living in poverty.

The most vulnerable Americans depend on the United States’ rather meager social safety net, which Trump seems hell bent on dismantling. Although Trump has been described as non-ideological, his unholy alliance with Speaker of the US House of Representatives Paul Ryan must certainly be characterized as deeply dogmatic. Ryan, a devout Roman Catholic, is almost without peer in his open hostility to the poor, and Trump has no better angels to call upon to resist him. Ryan has previously outlined plans to gut school lunches, food stamps, and Medicaid. Not even children, once held harmless like motherhood and apple pie, are off limits for the Ryan (and now Trump-Ryan) juggernaut. Given that we spend less than 10% percent of the federal budget on all safety net programs combined, it seems unlikely that insisting that millions of poor kids forego a turkey sandwich at lunchtime will really balance the budget. Instead, it seems Ryan is determined to shame, control, and penalize the poor, and he seems to have found a new ally in Trump, a man who extolls the virtues of being rich as evidence of superior moral character.

A Trump-Ryan alliance should be terrifying for anyone who cares about how little separates the American poor from abject misery. In fact, the official US poverty line is just under $12,000 ($11,880) for a single person or just over $24,000 a year for a family of four. In 2015, 43.1 million Americans were officially classified as poor, and yet little was made of their material deprivation during the election. If four people living on less than $25,000 is already an undeniable hardship, Ryan’s radical approach to government indicates he intends to further disembowel our measly safety net. Programs that were previously considered sacrosanct—such as Social Security, the holy grail of the welfare state developed during Roosevelt’s New Deal, and Medicare and Medicaid, developed during Johnson’s Great Society period—are now likely under threat. Ryan has repeatedly called for block granting or privatization schemes that will fundamentally alter these programs, leaving them vulnerable to the vagaries of the market instead of being a shelter from them. Under almost any presidential administration, Republican or Democrat, this would be unthinkable. Tinkering with Social Security and Medicare has long been the third rail of American politics, largely because these are programs with broad, i.e., white and elderly, constituencies. But, as many others have noted, nothing about this election or Trump has been normal.

Ironically, the national media has coalesced around the vulnerability of the white working class while omitting the very real and persistent condition of Black, Brown, and white people who are poor or extremely poor. In 2011, poverty scholars Shafer and Edin found that approximately 1.55 million US households were raising 3.55 million children on less than $2 per person per day. Almost 4 million children: that’s almost as many people as the city of Chicago and its suburbs who subsist on less than $2 a day. For these families, who are often working in very low-paying, precarious jobs, the high-end manufacturing work we heard so much about during the election must seem like a relic from a different century. In other words, for the minority poor who are often last hired and first fired, high-quality jobs have never seemed like an entitlement.

And yet, although everything about Trump brings a chill to my bones, Ryan may be the most wicked of them all. In contrast to chief strategist Steve Bannon, Ryan casts himself as the suited up, scrubbed clean Midwestern everyman, ready to decimate everything we’ve fought so hard for. Where Bannon uses his media platform to spew white supremacy, Ryan uses the indiscernible tool of block granting to codify institutional racism and economic exploitation. Under Trump-Ryan’s dystopian vision, Black, Brown and poor white people will suffer death by a thousand budget cuts.

But we cannot let that happen. The long fight for poor people’s rights, and anti-oppressive struggles in general, predates the Trump-Ryan impending apocalypse (see Davis 2014). Poor people’s movements, like other social movements, have long emerged in the face of repression and exploitation (see Piven and Cloward 1979). One such movement, the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO), developed in the 1960s, led primarily by Black women sick and tired of toiling in the low-wage labor market. These women developed a broad national coalition that fought for minimum income floors, adequate food, and minimum standards for furniture and clothing. The women of NWRO coalesced during a period of great social upheaval, and they successfully (for a time) reclaimed the idea that society had a social and fiscal responsibility to poor and non-white women raising our nation’s children.

I am not naïve enough to suggest that this historical moment mirrors the 1960s. Yet, we have much to learn from the history of anti-racist, anti-colonial, worker’s, feminist, and anti-capitalist movements. Now is the time to look to collective action movements for substantive lessons in vigilance and solidarity. As austerity and authoritarianism are reemerging across the globe, it is clear that the United States is vulnerable to these modes of governance. As Trump and Ryan lead this wave stateside, we are called upon to resist the metaphorical tyranny of allowing children to go to school hungry. Collective action and social movements can, and always have, push back against the plunder of social institutions and social programs. Fighting for the most vulnerable is indeed a fight for our way of life, because democracy cannot function without a safe harbor from the vicissitudes of capitalism. If we are to reclaim our republic, we must pay attention to our neighbors with too little food, medicine, or shelter.

The Trump-Ryan alliance is ready to ransack what remains of our system of social security. As people of conscience, we must be one step ahead of them.

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References and Further Readings
Davis, A. 2014. Freedom is a Constant Struggle. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
Piven, F.F. and R.A. Cloward. 1979. Poor People’s Movements. New York: Vintage Books.

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*Tina Sacks is Assistant Professor at the School of Social Welfare at the University of California, Berkeley. Her fields of special interest include racial disparities in health; social determinants of health; race, class and gender; and poverty and inequality.

Header image (left): Poor People’s March at Lafayette Park, Washington, DC (1968) (edited). From Wikicommons.

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